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I. INTRODUCTION
Injustice is born in poverty1 and lives in prison. Every day, the
U.S. prison system sacrifices millions of futures,2 allowing inmates to
be lost in the machinery of a system that excludes lawyers from the
last line of defense.3 Neither finality nor a right to counsel has caused
the United States to recognize that financial inequality imposes
limitations on justice and that justice does not end at conviction and
subsequent confinement.4 Due process and equal protection can
expose the roots of mass incarceration in prejudice and poverty, and
reveal longstanding justifications for a right to post-conviction
counsel.
1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOW THE CENSUS BUREAU MEASURES POVERTY (2016),
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/about.html
[https://perma.cc/UG87-DESN] (explaining that “the Census Bureau uses a set of
money income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to determine who
is in poverty” and that “[i]f a family’s total income is less than the family’s threshold,
then that family and every individual in it is considered in poverty”); U.S. DEP’T OF HE
ALTH & HUM. SERVS., POVERTY GUIDELINES (effective Jan. 13, 2018),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/PQ3P-6L44]; see Philip
Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to the U.S, ¶
4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33/Add.1 (May 4, 2018),
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1629536/files/A_HRC_38_33_Add-1-EN.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PTS7-EBRG] (reporting that “[a]bout 40 million live in poverty,
18.5 million in extreme poverty, and 5.3 million live in Third World conditions of
absolute poverty”).
2. See Alston, supra note 1, ¶ 4; Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander: “A System
of Racial and Social Control”, FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/frontline/article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control/
[http://perma.cc/X3QK-B352] (noting that incarceration often “strip[s] [people] of
basic civil and human rights” and “operates to control people . . . and virtually all
aspects of their lives”).
3. See Courtney Mault, Last Line of Defense, SUPER LAWYERS,
https://www.superlawyers.com/alabama/article/last-line-of-defense/0b590dda-
a7ab-4b32-bc86-cbd9e739aabd.html [5ZCV-AAPC].
4. See Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After
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In Gideon v. Wainwright, Gideon argued that poverty led to
inequality and the United States heard him.5 However, millions in
prison plead inequality and no one hears them. For these inmates,
dignity and autonomy are suspended, replaced with fear and
uncertainty.6 Thus, indigent prison inmates inhabit an underworld
where no one speaks for the dead. For after the jury has gone home
and the court has decided the appeal, no right to counsel exists.7 And
without representation, the punished are extinguished by time—
trapped in the limbo of ineffective self-representation, harsh
confinement, prejudice, and indifference.8 Post-conviction justice is
based on an equation that does not add up—a Sixth Amendment that
protects the process for conviction but abandons the means for
vindication.9 Poverty has become the lodestone of justice that attracts
the full spectrum of constitutional rights for post-conviction redress.
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that “any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him”).
6. See Amanda Ploch, Note, Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not)
to Rehabilitation from International and National Perspectives, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 886, 894–98 (2012); Abby Rogers, Inmates Describe What it’s like to Walk into
Prison on that Very First Day, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 5, 2012, 8:54 AM), https://www.busin
essinsider.com/what-its-like-in-prison-2012-7 [https://perma.cc/R29F-SHTB].
7. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555, 559 (1987) (holding that “a defendant has no federal constitutional right to
counsel . . . when attacking a conviction that has long since become final upon
exhaustion of the appellate process”); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1974).
8. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 881 (2009) (noting that “all state-created prison conditions
should be understood to constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes”);
Deliberate Indifference and Inmates’ Civil Rights, EXPERT WITNESS NEWS (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.expertwitnessnews.com/deliberate-indifference-and-inmates-civil-
rights/ [http://perma.cc/T5AA-Y5TA]. See generally Melissa Hogenboom, Criminal
Myths: Misconceptions About Criminals and Crime, BBC (Apr. 16, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20180412-criminal-myths-misconceptions-
about-criminals-and-crime [https://perma.cc/G8XH-R9B2] (looking at “the
consequences of locking up women who are mentally ill, discovering how personality
changes in prison and looking at the mistaken idea that long prison sentences reduce
crime”).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
3
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Prison populations are the product of sentencing laws, parole
practices, and the attrition of reentry and early release. Overall, the
core of confinement is at staggeringly high numbers, built up in less
than one generation.10 Social scientists, policy makers, and legal
scholars ask about the true composition of the nation's prison
population in terms of risks to public safety.11 However, these
questions overlook the more important human costs of ignoring the
suffering that the justice system imposes on the uncounted innocent
and the disenfranchised guilty.12 A true picture of the United States’
his defence.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1354 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a
prisoner was not deprived of equal protection rights when he was denied access to
the public defender’s investigative staff to prevent a conflict of interest between two
criminal defendants).
10. See OLIVER HINDS ET AL., PEOPLE IN PRISON 2017 2 (2018),
https://www.vera.org/publications/people-in-prison-2017
[https://perma.cc/AD2E-DYQF] (describing overall incremental decline, as well
individual state-level increases in the national incarcerated population, relying on
data gathered directly from the jurisdictions); PENAL REFORM INT’L, GLOBAL PRISON TRE
NDS 2018 10-15 (2018), https://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
04/PRI_Global-Prison-Trends-2018_EN_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA3F-HPKK]; T
HE SENTENCING PROJECT,-INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS, 1980-2016 1 (2018) https://
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-
and-Girls-1980-2016.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=12d509dd-a247-4f77-
a4f8-6d0fdbe0cd6e [https://perma.cc/YV6P-ZULP] (“The female prison population
stands nearly eight times higher than in 1980. More than 60% of women in state
prisons have a child under the age of 18.”); Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass
Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc/S73J-
M3TT] (providing a comprehensive overview of incarceration nationwide and noting
that “[t]he American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719
state prisons, 102 federal prisons, 1,852 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local
jails, and 80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration detention
facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S.
territories”).
11. See ADAM GELB, YOU GET WHAT YOU MEASURE: NEW PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS NEEDED TO GAUGE PROGRESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2 (2018),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/fil
es/you_get_what_you_measure.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM9B-QH69] (arguing that
“[t]racking the sheer number of incarcerated individuals and those under
correctional supervision is essential but not enough to know whether we are making
progress toward a more fair and effective criminal justice system.”).
12. Ken Strutin, Mass Incarceration and the “Degree of Civilization”, L. & TECH.
RESOURCES FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.llrx.com/2012/09/
mass-incarceration-and-the-degree-of-civilization/ [https://perma.cc/CVF4-STS4]
(“Incarceration is when a person loses their freedom pending trial or by serving a
4
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confined would likely reveal a broad swath of pain, mistreatment, and
injustice. However, it appears that no group has endeavored to take a
census on the exact number of prisoners enduring these
punishments.13
Perjury, official misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel,
forensic error,14 and racial profiling all contribute to the countless
people who are enchained and imprisoned for crimes they did not
commit—or that didn’t happen at all.15 These inmates are penalized
beyond reasonable human limits to de facto life sentences,16 where
sentence. Mass incarceration is when millions of people are imprisoned and kept
there based on a generation of tough on crime policies. Viewed another way,
incarceration is a personal problem; mass incarceration is everyone’s problem. And
the number of people behind bars, which is higher in the United States than anywhere
in the world, creates a ripple effect throughout the criminal justice system and society
at large.”).
13. See D’Vera Cohn, Counting Prisoners in the 2010 Census, PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/02/11/counting-
prisoners-in-the-2010-census/ [http://perma.cc/533Z-PTKD] (explaining the
process of counting prisoners); see also Prison Gerrymandering Project, PRISON POL’Y I
NITIATIVE, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html
[http://perma.cc/7QL4-QXVM] (noting that the “way the Census Bureau counts
people in prison creates significant problems for democracy and for our nation’s
future” and “leads to a dramatic distortion of representation and stare and local
levels, and creates an inaccurate picture of community populations for research and
planning purposes”).
14. See THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2017 (2018),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/44Q2-VTMV] (listing exonerations for 2017).
15. SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., RACE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES ii (2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Rac
e_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UZ5-LH2Z] (noting that
“African Americans are only 13% of the American population but a majority of
innocent defendants wrongfully convicted of crimes and later exonerated” and that
African Americans “constitute 47% of the 1,900 exonerations listed in the National
Registry of Exonerations (as of October 2016)”).
16. See Ken Strutin, The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing
Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012)
[hereinafter Strutin, Realignment] (discussing how the prison model of punishment
is “overdue for deconstruction or at least a major overhaul” and noting that the
“length of time to be served is imposed without any mention or consideration of the
conditions of confinement”).
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parole is forever impending, and old age and sickness are the only
ends to life in confinement.17
Living in fear of mistreatment and suffering from isolation, there
is no end to the Job-like18 conditions prisoners face.19 Hence,
confinement is the domain of pain and suffering.20 For the confined,
the legal remedy largely consists of self-reliant—that is, pro se—
lawyering. Given the limited access to and the decayed condition of
routinely available legal knowledge, such pro se lawyering often leads
to blind self-representation and naïve expectations of fruitful
resolutions. Indeed, no known survey has thoroughly documented
prison law libraries’ detailed conditions, nor are there reports on any
existing resources in solitary confinement, psychiatric commitment,
or immigration detention.21 Only prison biographies fully expose the
17. Ken Strutin, Life Expectancy and the Algorithms of Confinement, N.Y. L.J., (Mar.
26, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/03/26/life-
expectancy-and-the-algorithms-of-confinement/ [https://perma.cc/NJ4K-BGCB]
(explaining how life expectancy regulates time in confinement); see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1-2 (2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_d
ocument/coderedreportdeathsicedetention.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JQX-3V2R]
(finding that systemic problems with the medical care in immigration detention
facilities contributed to a large number of deaths).
18. Job 1:1–22 (telling the story of Job, a man who suffered severe physical and
mental anguish, yet was innocent of wrongdoing).
19. See, e.g., Gabrielle Banks & Keri Blakinger, Heat Wave Sparks Concerns in
Sweltering Texas Prisons, HOUS. CHRONICLE (July 22, 2018), https://www.chron.com/n
ews/houston-texas/houston/article/Heat-wave-sparks-concerns-in-sweltering-
Texas-13089898.php [https://perma.cc/TG5K-6A6Q] (“State prison officials are in
emergency-response mode this week as a heat wave bears down on a large swath of
Texas, rivaling the system that triggered the deaths of 10 inmates from heat stroke i
n 2011.”); Michael Waters, How Prisons Are Poisoning Their Inmates, OUTLINE (July 23
, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://theoutline.com/post/5410/toxic-prisons-fayette-
tacoma-contaminated [https://perma.cc/Q6B2-KVCL] (“[A]n environmental impact
statement considers only the impact the prison might have on the local environment,
not the impact the local environment might have on the prison or on the people
incarcerated within it.”).
20. Ken Strutin, Pleading Dignity: Alchemizing Form Into Substance, N.Y. L.J.,
(May. 17, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/12027
57300282/pleading-dignity-alchemizing-form-into-substance/ [https://perma.cc/T
P9Y-8G32] [hereinafter Strutin, Pleading Dignity] (explaining that this chronic state
of fear and agony stifles the cognitive life of these pro se defendants).
21. Jonathan Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: The Failings and the Future of
Prison Law Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171 (2013) (discussing how prison law libraries
are not a means of accessing information, but a means of controlling inmates’
6
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widespread poverty and dismal living faced by those held in
confinement.22
II. POVERTIES OF CONFINEMENT
Our prisons are fueled by poverty that stigmatizes personhood
and elbows out constitutional rights.23 The unrepresented poor are
the very same pro se defendants who share prison cells with the
fortunate few who manage to retain a lawyer.24 The latter have the
right to hire counsel to file habeas corpus writs and discretionary
appeals; the former resort to making copies of other represented
prisoners’ briefs and refile them as writs.25 An impoverished prisoner
behavior); see KATE LEWIS, CENSORSHIP AND SELECTION IN PRISON LIBRARIES 3–4 (2013),
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~kmm558/eport/522_biblio_lewis.pdf
[http://perma.cc/95HU-GH4L] (noting that “[c]ollection policies are not completely
standard in United States prison libraries, and so the extent of censorship is not
known” and that there is “a definite need for more academic investigation into finding
ways of incorporating actual inmate experiences into how collection policies are
enacted”).
22. See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as
Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111 § 2[a] (1973)
(describing inmates’ complaints of physical abuse); Dana Goldstein, Riker’s Island
Population 9,790: New York’s Penal Colony Through the Eyes of People Who Live and
Work There, INTELLIGENCER, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2015/06/inside-rikers-
island-interviews.html [http://perma.cc/W5GC-BKBG] (describing prison life
through the eyes of inmates).
23. Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-
Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [http://perma.cc/9DNR-
CPCU]. See generally Ed Pilkington, Why the UN is Investigating Extreme Poverty . . . in
America, the World’s Richest Nation, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/01/un-extreme-poverty-america-special-
rapporteur [https://perma.cc/4Q4B-HVQS] (“With 41 million Americans officially in
poverty according to the US Census Bureau (other estimates put that figure much
higher), one aim of the UN mission will be to demonstrate that no country, however
wealthy, is immune from human suffering induced by growing inequality.”).
24. See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (affirming the right to privately
retain counsel, the Court declared that “[b]y denying petitioner any opportunity
whatever to obtain counsel on the habitual criminal accusation, the trial court
deprived him of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment”);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say that the right
to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice.”).
25. See 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 1 (2018) (“The writ of habeas corpus is an order
directed to anyone having a person in custody to produce the person at a time and
7
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is only appointed pro bono counsel under very rare, discretionary
circumstances after the “Gideon limit” has been reached.26 At the
inception of a criminal prosecution, poverty metrics allow appointed
lawyers to level the playing field between the wealthy and the poor.27
But additional requirements and thresholds are necessary if the right
to counsel is ever going to reach into prison—where poverty and
inequality are unrelenting.
A. Poverty’s Reach into Prison
For the indigent defendant, finances become intimately
intertwined with their liberty almost immediately. It begins with the
inability to post bail. Consequently, the indigent defendant is unable
to support a family while in custody. Moreover, even when a
defendant is able to post bail, he may lose the ability to support his
family due to employer concerns about the pending charges.28 Next,
place stated in the order and to show why the person is held in custody. The writ
stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.”);
see also Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d
645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“An order denying relief on the merits is a final
judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding. Therefore, it is immediately appealable by
the unsuccessful petitioner.” (quoting 43B GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, TEXAS
PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 47.51 (2d ed. 2001))).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2) (2010) (stating that when the court determines that
the “interests of justice so require . . . representation may be provided for any
financially eligible person”); Jonathan J. Neal, “Critical Stage”: Extending the Right to
Counsel to the Motion for New Trial Phase, WM & MARY L. REV. 783, 783 (2003) (noting
that the circuit courts are split “over the reach Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel doctrine as it applies to criminal defendants in the post-trial setting”
(citations omitted)).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1), (2); see also MINN. STAT. § 611.17 (2012)
(providing the financial eligibility guidelines for Minnesota state courts to determine
if a defendant qualifies for a public defender); 7 U. S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY
§ 230 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-
guidelines/chapter-2-ss-230-determining-financial-eligibility
[https://perma.cc/WV6X-ZBGD] (providing the guidelines for determining eligibility
for federal public defense).
28. Bronwyn Timmons, Can an Employer Fire You over Pending Charges?, NEST,
https://woman.thenest.com/can-employer-fire-over-pending-charges-19967.html
[http://perma.cc/M5PH-9SMG]; see Lanie Petersen, Can I Still Get a Job If I Got
Arrested and Not Convicted?, CHRON, https://work.chron.com/can-still-job-got-
arrested-but-not-convicted-21382.html [http://perma.cc/8GRQ-XABS] (addressing
the difficulties that an arrest record may cause in the employment status of the
accused).
8
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the defendant is unable to afford private counsel, expert witnesses, or
investigators. As a result of the defendant’s finances—or rather, his
lack thereof—most decisions about his case have already been
decided. Poverty takes hold of the defendant’s decision-making while
prison seals his fate. Stated simply, poverty and prison do all the
thinking. Put together, they are responsible for a defendant’s induced
guilty plea, negligent waiver of appeal, and unseen compromises
made in absence of the guidance from hired counsel. So indeed,
poverty forces less fortunate people into mass incarceration.29
Over time, poverty has become a catalyst to the institutional
prejudices that result from incarceration.30 Incarceration, when
paired with poverty, further exacerbates the hardships of the
societally disadvantaged that stem from a variety of characteristics,
29. See Alston, supra note 1, ¶ 71 (“Mass incarceration is used to make social
problems temporarily invisible and to create the mirage of something having been
done.”).
30. See Michelle Alexander, Speech at the Unitarian Universalist Association
General Assembly (June 2012), https://www.uua.org/multiculturalism/ga/new-
jim-crow [http://perma.cc/3CXE-76KM] (“For the rest of their lives, once branded
[as a felon], you may find it difficult, or even impossible to get housing or even to get
food.”); Criminalization of Race and Poverty, INSTITUTE FOR POL’Y STUD., https://ips-
dc.org/criminalization-of-race-and-poverty/ [http://perma.cc/T43V-MAJ9] (“Poor
and low-income people, especially people of color, face a far greater risk of being
targeted, profiled, fined, arrested, harassed, violated and incarcerated for minor
offenses than other Americans.”).
9
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including race;31 gender,32 gender preference; indigenousness;33
homelessness;34 religion; citizenship status;35 mental disabilities;36
31. Mass incarceration is the fullest expression of racism and bias. “Racial and
ethnic minorities have long been disproportionately represented in the US criminal
justice system. While accounting for only 13 percent of the US population, African
Americans represent 28.4 percent of all arrests. According to Bureau of Justice
Statistics approximately 3.1 percent of African American men, 1.3 percent of Latino
men, and 0.5 percent of white men are in prison. Because they are disproportionately
likely to have criminal records, members of racial and ethnic minorities are more
likely than whites to experience stigma and legal discrimination in employment,
housing, education, public benefits, jury service, and the right to vote.” Discrimination,
Inequality, and Poverty--A Human Rights Perspective, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 11, 2013,
7:01 PM) (citations omitted), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/11/discriminat
ion-inequality-and-poverty-human-rights-perspective [https://perma.cc/Z58H-
NMJM].
32. See Alston, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 56–60 (describing social discrimination in
access to and quality of services to the female poor, further exacerbated by racism
and non-citizenship); see also Claire Melamed, Gender Is Just One of Many Inequalities
that Generate Poverty and Exclusion, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2012, 3:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2012/mar/09/gender-inequality-poverty-exclusion
[https://perma.cc/29A9-8ESB] (discussing how gender, along with class, race, and
ethnicity, has a role in inequality).
33. See Alston, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 61–64 (noting that “[p]overty, unemployment,
social exclusion and loss of cultural identity also have significant mental health
ramifications and often lead to a higher prevalence of substance abuse, domestic
violence and alarmingly high suicide rates in indigenous communities, particularly
among young people” and that “[s]uicide is the second leading cause of death among
American Indians and Alaska Natives aged between 10 and 34” (citation omitted)).
34. See id. ¶ ¶ 43–46 (“Homelessness on this scale is far from inevitable and
reflects political choices to see the solution as law enforcement rather than adequate
and accessible low-cost housing, medical treatment, psychological counselling and
job training.” (citation omitted)).
35. The inherent crossover between criminal law and the nation’s immigration
policy is undeniable. “Immigration laws and policies have the power to conflate race,
ethnicity and national origin with lawbreaking, economic rivalry and terrorism. A
targeted noncitizen occupies an indissoluble bubble of isolation . . . [F]or them
America is an inside out prison comprised of sensitive locations, sanctuary cities, and
degrading confinement. If the immigration system bears a resemblance to criminal
justice, it is because they share a forge upon which people are hammered out.” Ken
Strutin, Detainers, Detention and Deportation: From Presence to Personhood, L. & TECH.
RESOURCES FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Apr. 29, 2018) (citation omitted),
https://www.llrx.com/2018/04/detainers-detention-and-deportation-from-
presence-to-personhood/ [https://perma.cc/5SN9-5ZMG]; see Erika J. Nava, Legal
Representation in Immigration Courts Leads to Better Outcomes, Economic Stability,
N.J. POL’Y PERSP. (June 19, 2018), https://www.njpp.org/blog/legal-representation-
10
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and deficits in education.37 The economically disadvantaged deserve
a right to post-conviction counsel in light of the conditions created or
further exacerbated by confinement and the resulting discrimination
and indifference.38
in-immigration-courts-leads-to-better-outcomes-economic-stability
[https://perma.cc/9JV6-ZUQ2] (“Studies have shown that offering legal
representation in immigration court increases the likelihood of an individual winning
their case, being released to their families, and consequently improving the lives of
families. In addition, legal representation has positive impacts in the communities
where immigrants reside as deportations not only hurt the individuals, but also their
families and local economies. Creating . . . program[s] that expand[] access to counsel
for detained immigrants will not only bolster [affected] immigrant families, but the
broader state economy.” (citation omitted)); see also Erik Slobe, California Enacts Law
That Limits When Immigration Status Can Be Used In Open Court, JURIST (May 18, 2018,
7:55 PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/05/california-enacts-law-that-limits-
when-immigration-status-can-be-used-in-open-court/ [https://perma.cc/6LTR-
URQE] (discussing newly enacted California legislation prohibiting introduction of a
party’s immigration status absent judge’s approval).
36. See Megan Hadley, Judges Called ‘Last Line of Defense’ for Mentally Ill in Justice
System, CRIME REP. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/04/16/prison
-should-be-the-last-resort-for-mentally-ill-experts-say/ [https://perma.cc/83ZL-
DYN7] (“The use of jails and prisons as frontline treatment facilities for individuals
with serious mental illness—for lack of adequate alternatives—is a ‘horrible
American tragedy.’” (quoting Judge Steven Leifman of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court of Florida)).
37. See Caitlin Curley, How Education Deficits Drive Mass Incarceration, GENFKD
(Nov. 18, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://www.genfkd.org/education-deficiency-drives-
mass-incarceration [http://perma.cc/CV5U-LKTW] (“A common thread through the
American incarceration system is a widespread inmate education deficiency.”).
38. See Ken Strutin, Prison Affected People: Punished to the Margins of Life, L. &
TECH. RES. FOR LEGAL PROF. (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.llrx.com/2016/12/prison-
affected-people-punished-to-the-margins-of-life/ [https://perma.cc/97A4-78G8]
[hereinafter Strutin, Prison Affected People] (discussing how “[i]mprisonment is a gut-
wrenching transformation that ages youth; saps vitality; claws at sanity; tears down
dignity; and steals the consolations of sleep, solitude, and security . . . [which] has
become accepted, even anticipated, as the path of criminal justice”); id. (“The
incarcerative experience embraces many scenarios that affect well-being, daily living,
and dignity: accessibility, mobility, independence and self-care (ADA/Rehabilitation
Act); adult and juvenile classifications and aging in (elderly entering prison, young
people aging into elderhood); death-in-custody (homicide, suicide, illness, accident,
neglect, mistreatment); disabilities (sensory, cognitive); double-bunking and
overcrowding; gender identity and sexual orientation (LGBT); infectious diseases as
well as chronic and acute medical conditions; mental health (problems, disorders,
illness); sexual abuse and rape (PREA); and solitary confinement.”); Becky Pettit &
Bryan Sykes, Incarceration, PATHWAYS, Special Issue 2017, at 24–26,
https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways_SOTU_2017_incarcera
11
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B. Constitutional and Legislative Concerns For Indigent Prisoners
Constitutional representation peaked with Gideon and crept
behind prison bars through the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Bounds v. Smith.39 However, constitutional representation
lost ground to both Casey's40 actual-injury standing requirement and
the restrictions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)41 on writ of habeas corpus applications.42 These changes left
inmates who were virtually unrepresented to make post-conviction
decisions on their own.43
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/M54F-55RF] (discussing how studies have shown a large
segment of the African-American population are imprisoned in such numbers and
durations that negatively implicate post-conviction means of economic self-
sufficiency, overall well-being of their children, and fosters generations of inequality).
“Despite decades of declines in crime and much talk about criminal justice reform,
incarceration remains a critical axis of racial and ethnic inequality in the United
States.” Id. at 26; see also Lovisa Stannow, Standing By as Prisoners Are Raped, N.Y. TI
MES (Jun. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/prison-rape-
sexual-violence.html [https://perma.cc/RS5K-8RND] (describing the shortfalls of
prison condition assessments and the need for legislation to improve them, such as
the First Step Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2018), apropos of the Prison Rape
Elimination Act).
39. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 824–25 (1977) (holding that indigent
inmates must be provided, at the state’s expense, with adequate assistance in
preparing for their defense, including appointing counsel, filing appropriate paper
work, and paying docket fees).
40. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (holding that actual injury is
required for inmates to allege a constitutional violation and that it is not enough to
allege inadequate law libraries or legal assistance—inmates must show the alleged
shortcomings hindered efforts to pursue a legal claim). Thus, the systemwide remedy
granted in Bounds was found to be beyond what was necessary. Id. at 355.
41. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996)) (limiting the
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody to one year upon a final
judgement or alleged constitutional violation by the state).
42. One scholar has argued that due to the complexity of the AEDPA’s standards
for habeas review—as well as the need for additional outside fact-finding in many
cases—the right to counsel ought to exist to ensure access to the courts. Emily Garcia
Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-
Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1282 (2012) [hereinafter Uhrig, Gladiators]; Emily Garcia Uhrig,
A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 604
(2009).
43. Strutin, Pleading Dignity, supra note 20 (“The majority of people in prison
have been plea bargained there without the constitutional backbone of a trial or the
12
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The concept of legislative exoneration is moving at a snail's pace
and only a modest amount of balance has been restored, due to the
recent friction of freestanding actual innocence and gateway claims.44
The absence of counsel has left pro se defendants on their own to
make use of new forensics for introducing newly discovered evidence,
to competently argue against systemic injustices, and to handle
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in hindsight.45
dignity of humane punishment. So, their uncounseled pleadings speak to the broken
promises of justice and just treatment, while dignity remains a ghost trapped behind
bars.” (citations omitted)). See generally People v. Emmett, 254 N.E.2d 744, 745 (N.Y.
1969) (“There is no substitute for the single-minded advocacy of appellate counsel.
Experience has demonstrated that they not infrequently advance contentions which
might otherwise escape the attention of judges of busy appellate courts, no matter
how conscientiously and carefully those judges read the records before them.”);
Strutin, Pleading Dignity, supra note 20 (“For want of the proper form, an incarcerated
person’s writ is lost; for want of legal understanding, their cause is lost. But where
human dignity is valued, no petition should be denied because it was written on the
wrong stationery.”).
44. See, e.g., Other Virginia Exonerations: Marvin Anderson, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.a
spx?caseid=2995 [http://perma.cc/6K5R-PE7L] (describing the nineteen-year
process of exoneration for one convicted felon); see also Leah M. Litman, Legal
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 423 n.10 (2018) (noting that
“[i]nnocence serves as a ‘gateway’ when it allows defendants to bypass procedural
restrictions” and that “[i]nnocence serves as a “freestanding” when it warrants
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”).
45. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) superseded by statute on
other grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132,
110 Stat. 1218 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012)) (first citing
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1 (1989) (applying to capital cases); then citing
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551 (1987) (refusing to excuse procedural default in
a federal habeas corpus claim on account of ineffectiveness of counsel, the Court
reasoned that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings”)); id. at 752 (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (noting
that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of
effective assistance and stating that “[c]onsequently, a petitioner cannot claim
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings”); id. at 752, 755
(stating that the petitioner must live with the consequences of his attorney’s error
but when collateral review is the “first forum” for raising ineffectiveness, the Court
recognized a right to litigate); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (noting
that, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel “must be raised
in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the
initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that
13
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In Betts v. Brady, the Supreme Court declared that “[e]very court
has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course
seems to be required in the interest of fairness.”46 Yet, considering
convictions valid when defendants are denied constitutional
representation creates the notion that justice is only served to those
who can financially afford it.47 As a result, the law has struggled to
keep up with social progression and has correspondingly turned a
blind eye to the conditions of our prisons.
However, there has been a steady expansion of judicial values
since Gideon's essential reliance on poverty.48 Beginning with due
process and equal protection, fair trial has extended into fair
sentencing—eschewing excessive punishment and embracing
cognitive rights.49 In Jones v. Barnes, the Supreme Court touted the
accused’s basic decisional rights, noting that “[i]t is also recognized
that the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain
proceeding was ineffective”); Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 271 (2012)
(“Abandoned by counsel, Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state
postconviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se. In
these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples’ death-cell
door.”).
46. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (“Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial.”).
47. See id. at 466 (stating that “it is evident that the constitutional provisions to
the effect that the defendant should be ‘allowed’ counsel . . . were intended to do away
with the rules which denied representation . . . but were not aimed to compel the state
to provide counsel for a defendant”).
48. See Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2488–97 (2013)
(discussing the judicial doctrines of retroactivity, limitations on habeas, challenging
prior convictions, and harmless error that developed from Gideon’s holding); see also
18 U.S.C. § 355 (a) (2010) (articulating “factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence”); cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) (discussing the
promulgation of sentencing guidelines as a means of Congress seeking to achieve
greater uniformity in judicial system sentencing).
49. See Ken Strutin, Litigating from the Prison of the Mind: A Cognitive Right to
Post-Conviction Counsel, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 343, 413 (2016)
[hereinafter Strutin, Litigating] (“The right to post-conviction counsel might be born
anew from the cognitive conditions of confinement.”); see also Fair Sentencing Act,
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law-reform/fair-
sentencing-act [http://perma.cc/HPJ5-J837] (discussing “step[s] toward fairness” in
the discrepancy in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine offenses).
14
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fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal”
and, to a certain degree, proceed pro se.50 Jurisprudence on self-
representation and waiver of rights also speaks to the advancement
of values that safeguard the right of due process.51 Thus, Gideon
started an earnest discussion of values underlying the Sixth
Amendment—the right that protects rights.
Congress added the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel” when
slavery was an accepted evil, women could not vote, and society
systematically discriminated against the poor.52 The Sixth
Amendment grew in stature after the Civil War Amendments
abolished slavery, federalized equality, and eventually opened the
door to state due process.53 And yet, Jim Crow, segregation, and
inequality persist by law and custom.54 Hence, the development of the
constitutional right to counsel crawled from the decision in Powell v.
Alabama55 to the decision in Gideon.56
50. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding that defense counsel was
not required to raise all non-frivolous issues requested by a defendant if counsel
exercised professional judgment in deciding which issues to raise).
51. The Jones dissent stressed the importance of “the values of individual
autonomy and dignity central to many constitutional rights, especially those Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights that come into play in the criminal process.” Id. at 763
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE
REPARATIONS 1–14 (2d ed. 2012) (asserting that despite advances since the civil rights
era, the United States remains fundamentally racist); MARK E. KANN, THE GENDERING OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: FOUNDING MOTHERS, FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE POLITICAL PATRIARCHY
3–8 (1999) (arguing that gender bias was established during the founding of the
country); Gerald L. Neuman, Equal Protection, “General Equality” and Economic
Discrimination from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281, 296 (1999) (“[T]he
Constitution has not been interpreted as entitling the poor, or the middle class, to the
quality of counsel that rich defendants can afford.”).
53. See What Were the Reconstruction Amendments?, LAWS,
https://constitution.laws.com/reconstruction-amendments
[http://perma.cc/4QF3-VCBS] (explaining that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments form the Civil War Amendments and describing the rights that
these amendments confer).
54. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 1 (2010) (noting that “America is still not an egalitarian society”).
55. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that trial court’s failure
to appoint effective counsel for defendants constitutes a violation of a defendant’s
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
15
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The exoneration movement57 has created ripples in post-
conviction waters, accumulating statistics that decry the infallibility
and finality of criminal convictions and the role of discrimination.58
Although actual innocence provides some resistance against the force
of the AEDPA restrictions, a constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel must go further—based on the broad tenets of equal justice.
To expand the right to post-conviction counsel requires a platform for
Sixth Amendment justice as broad as the platforms in Gideon and
Douglas v. California59—cases that spoke to financial poverty.
Consequently, the AEDPA has hardened the justice system
against meaningful review, vindication, and redemption.60 At the
same time, the AEDPA has elevated the need for professional
representation in the increasingly complex arena of federal habeas
corpus review.61 Post-conviction review must look beyond the false
images of the convicted and confined, beyond the stigma and obloquy,
and focus instead on prisoners’ constitutional dignity. Ultimately, a
post-conviction right to counsel would move justice forward on all
fronts, exposing systemic errors, malfeasance, and prejudice—all of
which are root causes of mass incarceration.62
57. Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone
of Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 133, 138
(2006); Richard E. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration
Movement? The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence 6–7 (Mar. 1, 2016)
(unpublished research paper) https://bit.ly/2QrzhdP [http://perma.cc/S5VS-
RXRW].
58. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 15, at 1; Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False
Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. AM. 7230, 7231 (2014) [hereinafter Gross, Rate of False Conviction],
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4034186/pdf/pnas.201306417.p
df [http://perma.cc/JF9A-2HFH].
59. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 356–57 (1963) (holding that defendants
were denied equal protection under the law when their appeal of right was decided
without the benefit of representation by counsel).
60. See generally Uhrig, Gladiators, supra note 42, at 1271–75 (arguing for a
constitutional right to counsel for state inmates in all initial federal habeas corpus
proceedings based on access-to-the-courts doctrine).
61. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
290 (2006) (“In the habeas corpus context, even more clarity is required given the
complexity of the tolling provisions, the fact that most prisoners do not have counsel
to assist in the preparation of a habeas petition, the inadequacy of many prison law
libraries, and the potential unjust loss of liberty—and in some cases, life.”).
62. See Tonja Jacobi & Ross Berlin, Supreme Irrelevance: The Court’s Abdication
in Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2033, 2035 (2018) (noting
16
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Without regard to wealth or innocence, Gideon enfranchised the
unrepresented poor. Still, poverty is but one obstacle to dignity.
Prejudices against the poor, people of color, culture, religion, lifestyle,
psychology, and physique—differences that pool into the misery of
mass incarceration—permeate the justice system.63 Although Gideon
alone cannot absolve society of its guilt, Gideon could awaken
lawmakers and judges to the injustices that outlive the verdict.
C. Poor Access to Technology Limits Pro Se Lawyering
When focusing on prisoners’ lawyering skills, the Court perhaps
fails to consider the lack of prisoner access to current information. A
crucial societal change since Gideon is the rise of an information-
reliant culture. Although the twenty-first century has fostered the first
generation that has been largely educated, entertained, and socialized
through computers, millions of people who are entrenched in poverty
and confinement are the exception.64 Because the impoverished are
without access to technology, their meaningful access to the courts is
limited.65
that “[s]ince the 1970s, incarceration in state and federal United States jurisdictions
has grown exponentially, making the U.S. a global anomaly in its rate of
imprisonment” and that “[n]ew approaches taken by the police, courts, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys to efficiently process this rapid escalation have both responded
to and contributed to the problem”).
63. See Alston, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 71, 72. See generally Trevor George Gardner,
Racial Profiling as Collective Definition, 2 SOC. INCLUSION, 52–59 (2014) (exploring the
co-construction of race and criminality through racial profiling).
64. See Mirko Bagaric, et. al., The Hardship That is Internet Deprivation and What
it Means for Sentencing: Development of the Internet Sanction and Connectivity for
Prisoners, 51 AKRON. L. REV. 261 (2017) (noting that the “pain that comes with internet
denial” creates “a considerable hardship”).
65. See Benjamin R. Dryden, Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner
Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 821 (2008) (noting that
although the Constitution guarantees prisoners meaningful access to the courts, few
prisons allow inmates access to digital legal research tools); see also Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 408 n.5 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although a prisoner would lose
on the merits if he alleged that the deprivation of that right occurred because the
State, for example, did not provide him with access to on-line computer databases, he
would also certainly have ‘standing’ to make his claim.”). But see James L. Esposito,
Virtual Freedom—Physical Confinement: An Analysis of Prisoner Use of the Internet, 26
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 39, 48–50 (2000) (listing examples of inmates
who have been able to use the internet as a public forum).
17
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An inmate’s ability to learn is environmentally limited, meaning
that his or her knowledge is limited by the accessible resources. In
rare instances, confinement turns people into autodidacts,66 but for
most, the division between the pro se prisoner and the technologically
sophisticated lawyer is insurmountable.67 Moreover, the already-
existent information barrier that separates the poor from the rest of
society multiplies when the indigent find themselves behind bars.68
Technology is enhancing the quality of legal research.69 Legal
technology companies are increasingly turning toward artificial
66. Autodidacts produced by confinement include Malcolm X, who copied a
dictionary word-for-word, and Robert Franklin Stroud, better known as the “Birdman
of Alcatraz,” who became a respected ornithologist and published author, all while
incarcerated. When X = Literacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com
/1993/01/06/opinion/when-x-literacy.html [https://perma.cc/5KPZ-QHAR];
Famous Inmates: Robert “the Birdman of Alcatraz” Stroud, ALCATRAZHISTORY.COM, http
s://www.alcatrazhistory.com/stroud.htm [https://perma.cc/AJD5-WZHY].
67. No professional born into this new world can escape the inevitable union
with increasingly smart technologies that will redefine lawyering. See Benjamin R.
Dryden, Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the
Internet Age, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 821 (2018) (“In the real world . . . the democratic
process denies prisoners access to the free law-related websites available online.”);
Edgar Alan Rayo, AI in Law and Legal Practice—A Comprehensive View of 35 Current
Applications, TECHEMERGENCE.COM, https://www.techemergence.com/ai-in-law-legal-
practice-current-applications/ [https://perma.cc/RPB6-5AXY] (discussing new AI
applications for due diligence; predication technology; legal analytics; document
automation; and electronic billing).
68. Dryden, supra note 65 at 821. Technology also has the capacity to reveal the
inevitable human shortfalls in research, even among lawyers and law clerks. See




the frequency with which litigators miss precedent cases); Casetext Survey Finds
‘Shocking’ Level of Missing Relevant Cases in US Courts, ARTIFICIALLAWYER.COM (Jun. 8,
2018), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/06/08/casetext-survey-finds-
shocking-level-of-missing-relevant-cases-in-us-courts/ [https://perma.cc/AC8T-
57YE] (“New research conducted by legal AI-led litigation research system Casetext,
has shown that 83% of US judges and their clerks find that lawyers’ briefs are missing
relevant cases that could impact the trial ‘at least some of the time.’”).
69. Jason Tashea, More Than 25 New Legal Tech AI Players Have Emerged in Past
Year, Report Says, A.B.A. J. (May 17, 2018, 3:08 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ne
ws/article/more_than_25_new_legal_tech_ai_players_have_emerged_in_past_year_re
port_say [https://perma.cc/5DCU-WHGX] (“Artificial intelligence offerings in the
legal tech field have increased by nearly two-thirds over the last year.”).
18
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intelligence systems to streamline research.70 Moreover,
technological databases can be laced with bias and prejudice.71 Hence,
prisoners are doubly victimized by human racism and technology
bias.
Prisoners are also often custodians of obsolete skills and
outdated sources.72 Additionally, a library—like a written brief—is
70. Technology is a game changer in legal research, to which attorneys and
judges are slowly adapting. Owen Byrd, Legal Analytics vs. Legal Research: What’s the
Difference?, L. TECH. TODAY (June 12, 2017), https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2
017/06/legal-analytics-vs-legal-research/ [https://perma.cc/JE82-R2GV] (noting
that “[l]egal analytics involves mining data contained in case documents and docket
entries, and then aggregating that data to provide previously unknowable insights
into the behavior of the individuals (judges and lawyers), organizations (parties,
courts, law firms), and the subjects of lawsuits (such as patents) that populate the
litigation ecosystem” and that “[l]itigators use legal analytics to reveal trends and
patterns in past litigation that inform legal strategy and anticipate outcomes in
current cases”). A Casetext poll of 100 state and federal judges revealed that “[m]ore
than two-thirds of judges surveyed said that attorneys missing cases before them has
materially impacted the outcome of a motion or proceeding.” Jake Heller, You’re Bad
at Legal Research, and Your Judge Knows It, ABOVE L. (May 24, 2018, 2:34 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/05/artificial-confusion-youre-bad-at-legal-
research-and-your-judge-knows-it/ [https://perma.cc/NZ68-8Z9G]. In turn,
attorneys are putting more energy into the use of AI in legal research to maintain and
raise the quality of search results. Indeed, legal analysis is lending itself more and
more to algorithmic enhancement beyond the range of human abilities.
71. The faults and prejudices of human thinking are being passed down and
legitimized by machine learning and big data. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO
PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/5AQH-J2LY]; Stephen
Buranyi, Rise of the Racist Robots—How AI Is Learning All Our Worst Impulses,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/
aug/08/rise-of-the-racist-robots-how-ai-is-learning-all-our-worst-impulses
[https://perma.cc/Z346-8R39] (explaining that a new computerized prejudice
against the poor and people of color has been sanitized by algorithms adopted
without scrutiny); Ken Strutin, Risk Assessment for Computerized Humanity, N.Y. L. J.
(Jul. 23, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/07/23/ri
sk-assessment-for-a-computerized-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/K6ZU-XEJN] (“We
have only just arrived at a time when implicit bias in judicial sentencing has been
acknowledged.”); see Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and
“Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 491–92
(2014).
72. See ELIZABETH GREENBERG ET AL., LITERACY BEHIND BARS: RESULTS FROM THE 2003
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY PRISON SURVEY 29, 77 (2007) (discussing studies
showing “[p]rison inmates had lower average prose, document, and quantitative
literacy than adults living in households”).
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not the functional equivalent of a lawyer. However, without a library,
the pro se defendant is at an extreme disadvantage.
III. MASS INCARCERATION
Statistics exist that measure mass incarceration.73 However,
those numbers may be misleading,74 for they only count bodies
behind bars.75 Statistics do not take into account the persons who fill
up the nation's stockpile of punishment.76 There are few, if any,
numbers that reveal the number of innocent, wrongfully convicted,
excessively punished, mistreated, abused, and dying prisoners.77
73. See E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2016 1 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVQ8-8VCL]
(providing statistics on the U.S. prison population and reporting that the “United
States had an estimated 1,505,400 prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and
federal correctional authorities as of December 31, 2016”).
74. MALCOLM C. YOUNG, PRISONERS IN 2016 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR AN END TO MASS
INCARCERATION 1 (2018), http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/FINAL-
Prisoners-in-2016-and-the-Prospects-for-an-End-to-Mass-Incarceration-11-
June%20-May-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTX8-FJ2B] (stating that “[a]t of the end
of 2016 this nation was far from reducing prison populations at a pace that would end
mass incarceration in the foreseeable future, if at all” and that “it will take decades to
accomplish the goals announced by prominent reform organizations: a prison
population under one million; a prison population half its present size”); Ted Gest,
Incarceration Decrease? Drop in Prison Numbers Called ‘Anemic’, CRIME REP. (June 13,
2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/06/13/incarceration-decrease-
researcher-calls-drop-in-prison-numbers-anemic/ [https://perma.cc/D46T-PJMF].




report.pdf [https://perma.cc/52WV-PGHM] (proposing “a wider set of metrics by
which to analyze incarceration trends to supplement the old standard of state prison
population: 1) prison admissions[,] 2) jail admissions, 3) pretrial jail populations[,]
and 4) sentenced jail populations”).
76. Studies usually focus on rates of recidivism. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 [https://perma.cc/8W7K-
F4YC], (collection of statistical studies concerning recidivism rates among persons
released from prison); see also GELB, supra note 11, at 2 (suggesting “at least two new
and more nuanced indicators” to “know whether we are making progress toward a
more fair and effective criminal justice system”—correctional population
composition and recidivism by risk).
77. See, e.g., Gross, Rate of False Conviction, supra note 58 at 7231 (measuring
the number of “death-sentenced defendants in the United States, 1973–2004” using
the categories of “executed,” “died on death row but not executed,” “still on death
20
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Both the “broken windows theory” 78 and the “mosaic theory”79
suggest that capturing wrongful convictions and injustices through
routine review at the individual level might help illuminate the
systemic harms that otherwise go unnoticed. Prisoner surveys and
the National Registry of Exonerations only catalog the data that is
known.80 Assigning counsel creates opportunities to find the
uncounted actual innocents, the abused and tortured, those who are
discriminated against—those who suffer from all forms of
unpronounceable wrongs and unrecognized legal harms.81 In the
row” “removed from death row but not exonerated,” “exonerated, under threat of
execution,” and “exonerated, not under threat of execution”).
78. Adam J. McKee, Broken Windows Theory, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 13,
2017) https://www.britannica.com/topic/broken-windows-theory
[https://perma.cc/J8U2-CQTQ] (explaining that the “broken windows theory” is an
“academic theory proposed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982 that used
broken windows as a metaphor for disorder within neighbourhoods” and that the
theory “links disorder and incivility within a community to subsequent occurrences
of serious crime”); see George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The
Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/544K-
WR6M] (“Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a
building is broken and left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be
broken.”).
79. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 313 (2012), https://bit.ly/2C5c3W0 [http://perma.cc/VW6N-N8P6] (“Under
the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather
than as individual steps.” (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir.
2012), aff’d sub. nom United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)); Ken Strutin, Mosaic
Theory: A New Perspective for Human Privacy, N.Y. L.J. (2013) [https://advance.lexis.
com/search?crid=808ab01d-a8f1-471e-a577-fe04e862b9c6&pdsearchterms=LNSD
UID-ALM-NYLAWJ-1202620361750&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516
&pdisurlapi=true] (“Borrowed from the worlds of art, economics and national
security, mosaic theory has found resonance in criminal cases for creating composite
pictures from bits of disparate data.”).
80. See, e.g., Data Collection: Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities
(SISCF), BUREAU JUST. STATIST., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=275
[http://perma.cc/97WU-GHU5]; Library: Research: Statistics/Data, NAT’L PREA RES.
CTR., https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/library/research/statisticsdata
[https://perma.cc/EY5S-H57C] (listing of various research and data collected on
prisoner sexual abuse and rape in relation to the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act);
National Registry of Exonerations, MICH. ST. U. C.L., http://www.law.umich.edu/spec
ial/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/N2KZ-AUM6].
81. See Amber Baylor, Beyond the Visiting Room: A Defense Counsel Challenge to
Conditions in Pretrial Confinement, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 12, 25–28
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context of evaluating convictions or conditions of confinement, the
process of individual fact-finding may be the best barometer of a
justice system impeded by layers of doctrinal finality, deference, and
comity. That barometer was the promise of Gideon,82 the inspiration
behind the decades-long litigation in Brown v. Plata,83 and the work of
innocence projects at the forefront of forensic reformations.84
The effects of mass incarceration extinguish any realistic hope of
successful self-lawyering.85 For example, many convicted prisoners
carry the excruciating burdens of being innocent, wrongfully
convicted, and over-punished.86 Additionally, the majority of the
(2015) (“Defense attorneys are the most likely outside parties to learn of outrageous
conditions at the detention center through conversations with incarcerated clients.”).
82. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 509, 522 (2011) (affirming judgment where
judicial fact finding revealed the “impact of overcrowding” and “understaffing,
inadequate facilities, and unsanitary and unsafe living conditions”).
84. See The Need for Forensic Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/the-need-for-forensic-reform/
[http://perma.cc/A2WM-GDSV] (announcing the Innocence Project’s “launch of the
Campaign for Forensic Standards”); see also Ken Strutin, Report—President’s Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology Casts Doubt on Criminal Forensics, L. & TECH.
RESOURCES FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.llrx.com/2017/03/
report-presidents-council-of-advisors-on-science-and-technology-casts-doubt-on-
criminal-forensics [https://perma.cc/TJ2P-8CSE] [hereinafter Strutin, Report]
(“Among the more than 2.2 million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails, countless may
have been convicted using unreliable or fabricated forensic science. The U.S. has an
abiding and unfulfilled moral obligation to free citizens who were imprisoned by such
questionable means.” (quoting Alex Kozinski, Rejecting Voodoo Science in the
Courtroom, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rejecting-
voodoo-science-in-the-courtroom-1474328199 [https://perma.cc/AS4V-R2HG]).
85. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring
Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 348
(2006) (“Mass imprisonment has resulted in a predictable increase is post-conviction
appeals and habeas corpus filings, mostly by pro se litigants.”).
86. See Actual innocence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The absence
of facts that are prerequisites for the sentence given to a defendant.”); Wrongful
conviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A conviction of a person for a
crime that he or she did not commit.”); see also Misconviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (“The wrongful conviction of an innocent person, usually as a result
of erroneous or fraudulent forensic evidence or mistaken eyewitness identification.”).
Additionally, some sentences are illegal or excessive. See Stephanie Roberts Hartung,
Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 29 (2016) (“[I]n modern
jurisprudence, actual innocence plays ‘only a small role’ in adjudication of habeas
corpus petitions.”); Jessica S. Henry, Smoke but No Fire: When Innocent People Are
22
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incarcerated are enveloped in a system built on overcriminalization,
racial profiling, mandatory minimums, parole nullification,
procedural default, finality, and pro se lawyering.87 Indeed, criminal
law, poverty, and racism have inevitably become deeply
intertwined.88 Underfunded and overburdened, Gideon's promise
remains unfulfilled; hence, becoming a contributor to mass
incarceration.89 As one scholar noted:
There has also been a visible shift in the American
conscience about crime and criminality that has created a
presumption of guilt that poor and minority defendants
must overcome to avoid conviction once arrested. The
confluence of these factors makes the risk of wrongful
conviction fearfully high and has fueled real doubts about
many cases.90
Gideon spoke to poverty without addressing the underlying
source of racism91 and spoke to innocence without acknowledging the
Wrongly Convicted of Crimes That Never Happened, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665, 665
(2018) (“Nearly one-third of exonerations involve the wrongful conviction of an
innocent person for a crime that never actually happened.”).
87. See Ting Ting Cheng et al., Notes from the Field: Challenges of Indigent
Criminal Defense, 12 CITY N.Y. L. REV. 203, 238 (2008) (discussing a survey of criminal
defense attorneys serving indigent clients who stated that “[t]he criminal justice
system is still structured to work against poor people of color, who often experience
unequal treatment as a result of racial profiling, police abuse, and discrimination”).
88. See Stevenson, supra note 85, at 342. (‘The notion that the criminal justice
system is unfair is not just an apocryphal lament by the besieged and disaffected.
Courts have become much more tolerant of error in the administration of criminal
justice. Many of the current problems result from the sheer volume of criminal cases
that systems must now manage. Other systemic problems reflect policy choices about
how we respond to post-conviction complaints about illegal, incorrect, and unjust
convictions and sentences. These policy choices must be reexamined.”).
89. Id. at 344 (“Although some remedial efforts have been undertaken,
thousands of people have likely been wrongly convicted and imprisoned as a result
of unreliable and underfunded legal assistance.” (citations omitted)).
90. See id. at 345 (describing “a presumption of guilt and that poor and minority
defendants must overcome to avoid conviction once arrested”).
91. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J.
2236, 2240 (2013) (“The critical problem of the criminal justice system now, and the
one that particularly burdens African Americans, is not the wrongful conviction of the
innocent, as important as it is to remedy that injustice. The problem is a lack of
fairness in deciding what to criminalize and how to enforce those prohibitions. Most
criminal defendants affected by the war on drugs, other forms of overcriminalization,
and mandatory minimums and other harsh sentences are, as far as can be known,
guilty, and thus cannot, at least systematically, be exonerated even by excellent
23
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vast spectrum that might end in absolute guilt.92 Moreover, racial
profiling, overcriminalization, and presumed guilt based on
geography and areas of high crime have all escaped notice.93 Although
the right to counsel may have enshrined yesterday’s innocence, the
right left behind excessive convictions and confinements—a balloon
payment for the next generation.94
counsel. But convictions of the guilty selected for punishment because of race are not
the kinds of judgments Gideon was designed to prevent, and under the Court’s
decisions, they are not injustices which counsel can normally address.”).
92. See Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s
Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 324 (2010)
(“The dominance of the rhetoric of innocence also comes at the expense of the not-
quite-so-innocent but equally unfairly treated. Examples of the not-quite-so-innocent
run the gamut. There are criminal defendants who are guilty of something but not the
worst thing they are charged with. There are defendants who are guilty of something
other than what they are charged with. There are defendants who committed the
crime charged but with significant mitigating or extenuating circumstances. There
are defendants who committed the crime but they had never done anything like this
before, they lost control in a trying situation. There are defendants who committed
the crime and it is no wonder in view of how they came into the world and what they
endured after. There are defendants who committed the crime and have no excuse
whatsoever but, as death penalty lawyer Bryan Stevenson says, ‘[e]ach of us is more
than the worst thing we ever did.’”); see also Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death,
60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687, 749–50 (2010) (“The term ‘wrongful conviction’ itself is,
perhaps, artificially limited, as it excludes many convictions that are highly
problematic but not technically ‘erroneous—such as, for example, those obtained by
guilty pleas coerced by over-charging.’ Elevated attention to ‘glamorous’ innocence
claims may distract resources from the many other problems in the system that need
attention, such as disproportionate punishment. As Susan Bandes argues in the
capital punishment context, ‘Given the enormous amount of work left to be done in
reforming the criminal justice system it would be dispiriting to think that the
movement drew all its power from revulsion at the execution of those able to prove
they were blameless.’”). See generally Ken Strutin, Truth, Justice and the American
Style Plea Bargain, 77 ALB. L. REV. 825, 828 (2014) [hereinafter Strutin, Truth]
(explaining different forms of innocence and discussing various cases demonstrative
of variations of innocence).
93. Chin, supra note 91, at 2236 (“The Court’s second goal [in Gideon] was to
protect African Americans subject to the Jim Crow system of criminal justice. But, as
it had in Powell v. Alabama, the Court pursued this end covertly and indirectly,
attempting to deal with racial discrimination without explicitly addressing it.”).
94. See Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Efforts to Fix A Broken System: Brown
v. Plata and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1157 (2013)
(“The U.S. prison population experienced a rapid influx between 1970 and 2007,
growing by over 700% and effectively bringing the nation to the global forefront as
the world’s biggest incarcerator. In 2008, 1 in 100 American adults was behind bars;
24
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Today, rates of innocence among the convicted cannot easily be
judged and are often underestimated.95 Too many verdicts remain
unexcavated.96 Hence, the Court propelled a concept of innocence
rarity ahead of systemic failings that created mass incarceration.97
Gideon perpetuated—or poorly addressed—a bifurcated system of
justice that channels wealthy defendants to retained counsel and well-
funded resources, and poor defendants to the mainstreams of racial
profiling, gender discrimination, and the badges of indigence. It is the
composition of the mass incarcerated that drives the results for each
by 2009, 1 in 31 adults in the United States was either incarcerated or on some form
of probation. As of 2011, the United States imprisoned approximately 1.6 million
offenders, or about 25% of the world’s prison population, despite being home to only
5% of the world’s population.”).
95. Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y. TIMES A14
(Mar. 25, 2008) (discussing Professor Samuel R. Gross’s perspective: “Once we move
beyond murder and rape cases, we know very little about any aspect of false
conviction.”).
96. See Leon Friedman, The Problem of Convicting Innocent Persons: How Often
Does It Occur and How Can It Be Prevented?, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1056 (2012)
(discussing an analysis based upon 2009 criminal statistics that revealed “a rough
approximation of 24,704 cases” resulting in the conviction of innocent people each
year); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 761 (2007) (“To a great
extent, those who believe that our criminal justice system rarely convicts the factually
innocent and those who believe such miscarriages are rife have generally talked past
each other for want of any empirically justified factual innocence wrongful conviction
rate.”).
97. Joseph M. Ditkoff, The Ever More Complicated “Actual Innocence” Gateway to
Habeas Review: Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 896
(1995) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 n.36 (1995)) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s focus on the rarity of successful actual innocence defenses); see Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like other human
institutions, courts and juries are not perfect. One cannot have a system of criminal
punishment without accepting the possibility that someone will be punished
mistakenly. That is a truism, not a revelation. But with regard to the punishment of
death in the current American system, that possibility has been reduced to an
insignificant minimum. This explains why those ideologically driven to ferret out and
proclaim a mistaken modern execution have not a single verifiable case to point to,
whereas it is easy as pie to identify plainly guilty murderers who have been set free.
The American people have determined that the good to be derived from capital
punishment—in deterrence, and perhaps most of all in the meting out of condign
justice for horrible crimes—outweighs the risk of error. It is no proper part of the
business of this Court, or of its Justices, to second-guess that judgment, much less to
impugn it before the world, and less still to frustrate it by imposing judicially invented
obstacles to its execution.”).
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of these channels.98 Indeed, there are different kinds of poor,99 and to
truly achieve equal protection the right to counsel must be based on
more than balancing wealth.
Additionally, there are the post-incarceration forums that leave
persons without counsel, such as parole, clemency, and civil rights
actions.100 Strikingly, as individuals progress through the system,
fact-finding seems to grow—with newly discovered evidence,
recantations, and false confessions—while the right to counsel
seemingly dwindles.101 By the time the full record of an incarcerated
person's case is assembled, the person is often without resources and
representation.
Thus, lawyering for the dignity of the mass incarcerated is
socially constructive because it addresses the underlying causes:
98. In the technological information age, it is a contest between “million-dollar
brains” and “million-dollar blocks.” Compare Ken Strutin, The Million Dollar Brain, N.Y.
L.J. (May 14, 2018), [https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=0bbf9552-71be-4ce0-
9f09-ff4d8a19b12b&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-NYLAWJ-
glm45gdklj&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true]
[hereinafter Strutin, Million Dollar Brain] (“Legal education, information technology
and law practice add up to an expensive thinking machine. So, the right to counsel
means access to a million-dollar brain—the product of natural and artificial
intelligences. Now that lawyers have been upgraded by technology, the right to
counsel needs upgrading as well.”), with Emily Badger, How Mass Incarceration
Creates ‘Million Dollar Blocks’ in Poor Neighborhoods, WASH. POST (July 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/30/how-mass-
incarceration-creates-million-dollar-blocks-in-poor-neighborhoods/?utm_term=.4e
60b44437cd [https://perma.cc/WH4L-B6BL] (“This is the perverse form that public
investment takes in many poor, minority neighborhoods: ‘million-dollar blocks,’ to
use a bleak term first coined in New York by Laura Kurgan at Columbia University
and Eric Cadora of the Justice Mapping Center. Our penchant for incarcerating people
has grown so strong that, in many cities, taxpayers frequently spend more than a
million dollars locking away residents of a single city block.”).
99. ERIC JENSEN, TEACHING WITH POVERTY IN MIND: WHAT BEING POOR DOES TO KIDS’
BRAINS AND WHAT SCHOOLS CAN DO ABOUT IT 6 (2009) (listing six types of poverty:
situational, generational, absolute, relative, urban, and rural).
100. See, e.g., Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and
Innocence in America, 51 CAL. W.L. REV. 55, 72 (2014) (“[C]lemency is the final check
on whether the entire legal system has failed.”).
101. In federal habeas review, post-conviction fact-finding is circumscribed by
the state court record, often completed without the benefit of appointed counsel. See,
e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189–90 (2011) (holding that an attorney
abandoning investigation into mitigating factors after acquiring minimal knowledge
from a limited amount of sources does not prima facie demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel).
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poverty, racism, disempowerment, and discrimination.102 But, as
some observed, Gideon was a procedural decision, not a social one.103
IV. HOW TO BUILD A LAWYER?
Without any training or knowledge, the incarcerated person
cannot effectively analyze their proper cause of action, determine the
legal root of their problems, assert their legal rights, or request the
appropriate relief.
As a comparison, a person trapped in quicksand needs someone
standing on firm ground to pull him out of danger. This analogy
represents the heart and soul of the attorney-client relationship—a
distinct product of human dignity, where skilled advocates draw on
their years of experience to pull up the downtrodden and the
forlorn.104 When the imprisoned extend themselves through the mind
of counsel, the marginalization of confinement weakens.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed recipes for
legal representation that, in their minds, have justified assigning
lawyers in the first stages of trial and appeal, but not during the latter
102. See Martha Minow, Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 143, 153 (2002) (“Yet we can also view lawyering at the margins in terms
of the broader vision of human dignity permitted only when those marginalized by
social and economic structures are central.”).
103. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and
Identity in Lawyering, 114 YALE L.J. 1459, 1479 (2005) (“The representation of
accused clients like Gideon in the criminal justice system further exposes the tensions
between process considerations and rights mobilization.”).
104. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Criminal Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 41, 48–50 (1975) (discussing the attorney-client representation in the context
of representing indigent defendants).
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stages.105 In Powell,106 the Court delivered a vote in favor of
appointed counsel by focusing on certain factors:
[T]he ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth,
the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and
the close surveillance of the defendants by the military
forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in
other states and communication with them necessarily
difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their
lives . . . .107
This is a set of circumstances all too common for those serving
prison time.108 The Court even described cognitive and physical
challenges as being rampant amongst pro se prisoners.109
Accordingly, the Court felt the right to counsel was situational:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy,
or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or
not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to
105. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases establish that
the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”);
see Strutin, Litigating, supra note 49 at 347–49; cf. Karen Sloan & Tony Mauro, From
Convict to Counsel: Clearing the Hurdles to Practice, NAT’L L.J. (May 25, 2018, 11:35 A
M), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/05/25/from-convict-to-couns
el-clearing-the-hurdles-to-practice/ [https://perma.cc/55TX-V5JH]. Erin Thompson
, Law Schools Are Failing Students of Color, NATION (June 5, 2018), https://www.then
ation.com/article/law-schools-failing-students-color/ [https://perma.cc/X6DY-
NXY6] (“Legal education has failed and will continue to fail minorities. This shouldn’t
be surprising, since the entire American system of restricting admission to the
practice of law has long been designed, explicitly or implicitly, to exclude minorities.
Nowadays, of course, minorities are no longer simply prohibited from entering law
school. Instead, the system loads many of them with staggering debt before killing
their hopes, leaving them hanging from the very bootstraps they had hoped to use to
rise.”).
106. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
107. Id. at 71.
108. See Strutin, Realignment, supra note 16, at 1353–56 (listing common issues
that incarcerated persons face).
109. See Strutin, Litigating, supra note 49, at 360–65.
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preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and
trial of the case.110
Each iteration of the Court’s reasoning focused on the personal
characteristics of the accused.111 For instance, in describing the
hypothetical case of a prisoner charged with a capital offense, the
Court described him as “deaf and dumb, illiterate and feeble-
minded.”112
But it was this characterization from Powell that held sway in
Gideon: “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law.”113
More recently, in Lafler v. Cooper114 and Missouri v. Frye,115 the
Court examined the invaluable impact of lawyering skills during plea
bargaining—a process that propels the resolution of approximately
ninety-five percent of today’s cases.116
110. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 72.
113. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at
68–69) (“If charged with crime, [the pro se defendant] is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.”).
114. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (stating that “criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials” and that “[n]inety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas . . . the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be
defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays
in securing convictions and determining sentences”).
115. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (stating that “plea bargains have
become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
requires in the criminal process at critical stages”).
116. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170; Strutin, Truth, supra note 92, at 837 (“According to
the Bureau of Justice Statistics cited by the Supreme Court, guilty pleas represent
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Courts often seem to believe that a brief can be recycled post-
conviction and stand in the place of a lawyer.117 However, the totality
of lawyering is not comprised in any one brief, no matter how
comprehensive or insightful. The brief alone is simply not a
replacement for an attorney.
The right to counsel alchemizes the human experience by placing
one’s mind, liberty, and entire welfare into the direct care and
responsibility of another human being. The client, however, can never
separate himself from the events that led to his confinement. The
attorney is distinguishable from the client in this regard. The attorney
can separate herself from the underlying events that led to the client’s
incarceration. Furthermore, the attorney remains free from the
burdens of confinement and therefore retains a clear mind and sound
judgement to defend her client.
V. SHAPING THE LAW WITHOUT COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel dutifully protects due
process and equal protection in trials, pleas, and direct appeals.118 But
habeas corpus and other post-conviction remedies stand apart,
uninvited to dine at the main table.119 Instead, the unrepresented are
left to feed on the scraps of those who are fortunate enough to be
guided by hired counsel.
annually ninety-seven percent of federal and ninety-four percent of state
convictions.”).
117. Strutin, Litigating, supra note 49 at 377, 381.
118. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”), with GOV’T
PUBL’G OFFICE, RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1622, https://www.congres
s.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017-10-7.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ASL-
EM8N] (explaining that neither “appeals [nor] post-conviction applications for
collateral relief” are “considered to be criminal prosecutions for purposes of the
[Sixth] Amendment”).
119. The Right to a Public Defender, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/miranda-rights/right-to-public-
defender/ [http://perma.cc/H62K-JV7X] (“The Sixth Amendment generally does not
include a right to court-appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings, such as
appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.”).
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 16
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss1/16
296 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
A. Ross. v. Moffitt
Gideon’s right to counsel at the trial stage grew to include direct
appeal under Douglas,120 but ran out of constitutional steam in Ross v.
Moffit, where the Court held that there was no constitutional
requirement that indigent state defendants be appointed counsel for
discretionary state appeals or applications for Supreme Court
review.121 In two North Carolina cases, Claude Franklin Moffit, the
accused, enjoyed the benefit of appointed counsel at trial and on first
appeal.122 However, the discretionary appeal to the state supreme
court and later, to the U.S. Supreme Court, faltered for lack of assigned
counsel.123 Yet, the Fourth Circuit eventually granted the right to
counsel in both cases based on “fairness and equality.”124
The Supreme Court reversed.125 In doing so, the Court noted that
several Fourteenth Amendment cases—cases pertaining to a litigant’s
inability to pay for transcripts or filing fees—lacked explicit
constitutional footing.126 Moreover, the Court analogized that
discretionary appeals fall outside the explicit purview of the due
process clause.127 Citing Douglas, the majority articulated that the
rationale for first-appeal representation goes beyond financial access:
[A] State does not fulfill its responsibility toward indigent
defendants merely by waiving its own requirements that a
convicted defendant procure a transcript or pay a fee in
120. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963).
121. 417 U.S. 600, 610, 618–19 (1974).
122. Id. at 603.
123. Id. at 603–04.
124. Id. at 604–05.
125. Id. at 619.
126. Id. at 605–07 (listing cases such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) as examples that “invalidated . . . financial barriers
to the appellate process,” and Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), in which
“the Court departed somewhat from the limited doctrine of the transcript and fee
cases and undertook an examination of whether an indigent’s access to the appellate
system was adequate”); id. at 608–09 (stating that neither the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “by itself provides an
entirely satisfactory basis for the results reached” in “the Griffin and Douglas lines of
cases”).
127. Id. at 610–11 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (“[I]t is clear
that the State need not provide any appeal at all . . . . The fact that an appeal has been
provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to
provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way.”).
31
Strutin: From Poverty to Personhood: Gideon Unchained
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
2019] FROM POVERTY TO PERSONHOOD 297
order to appeal . . . the State must go further and provide
counsel for the indigent on his first appeal as of right.128
Thus, the majority implicitly asserted that access to a court
without the guidance of counsel was a meaningless right—at least on
direct appeal—when those without means relied on the appeals court
to assess the merits of each case.129
The Court in Ross further explained how the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically
applied to the Griffin and Douglas holdings: “‘Due process’ emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State,
regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. ‘Equal protection,’ on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations
are arguably indistinguishable.”130
The key concept from Douglas was that poverty should not close
the only door to an appeal as of right.131 According to Ross, even the
Equal Protection Clause had its limitations in conjunction to
discretionary review:
The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees. In
this case we do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause,
when interpreted in the context of these cases, requires
North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent
defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file petitions for
certiorari in this Court.132
The Court in Ross stated that at the point of discretionary appeal,
a lawyer would have already briefed the case in the intermediate
appellate court, which would empower the pro se prisoner to pursue
a discretionary appeal alone.133 Appeals to the highest state court or
U.S. Supreme Court are less concerned with the accuracy of a
128. Id. at 607.
129. Id. at 608.
130. Id. at 609.
131. Id. at 611.
132. Id. at 612.
133. Id. at 615 (“At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other
record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth
his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of
his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may
make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an
adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review.”).
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particular verdict than the direction of the law.134 The Supreme Court
recognized the efficacy of representation on discretionary review:
This is not to say, of course, that a skilled lawyer, particularly
one trained in the somewhat arcane art of preparing
petitions for discretionary review, would not prove helpful
to any litigant able to employ him. An indigent defendant
seeking review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina is
therefore somewhat handicapped in comparison with a
wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him in every
conceivable manner at every stage in the proceeding.135
Still, the majority did not abandon the belief that value of counsel
alone warranted assignment of counsel in every situation.136
Similarly, this reasoning applied to the appointment of counsel for
petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, where accuracy of the
verdict gives way to the general interests of jurisprudence.137
Similar to Bounds, the Court in Ross found that the states were
free to set up any system that met their needs without the compulsion
of a federal constitutional mandate:
134. Id. (“The critical issue in [the North Carolina Supreme Court], as we perceive
it, is not whether there has been ‘a correct adjudication of guilt’ in every individual
case, but rather whether ‘the subject matter of the appeal has significant public
interest,’ whether ‘the cause involves legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State,’ or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with
a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may deny certiorari even though
it believes that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect, since a decision
which appears incorrect may nevertheless fail to satisfy any of the criteria discussed
above.” (citations omitted)).
135. Id. at 616.
136. Id. (“[T]he fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent
defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. The duty of the
State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately
retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but
only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims
fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.”).
137. Id. at 616–17. The Supreme Court applied its reasoning equally to petitioners
under the federal system and further explained “this Court has followed a consistent
policy of denying applications for appointment of counsel by persons seeking to file
jurisdictional statements or petitions for certiorari in this Court.” Id. at 617. For
support, the Court pointed to Drumm v. California, 373 U.S. 947 (1963), Mooney v.
New York, 373 U.S. 947 (1963), and Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U.S. 819 (1963);
ultimately concluding: “In the light of these authorities, it would be odd, indeed, to
read the Fourteenth Amendment to impose such a requirement on the States, and we
decline to do so.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 617–18.
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We do not mean by this opinion to in any way discourage
those States which have, as a matter of legislative choice,
made counsel available to convicted defendants at all stages
of judicial review. Some States which might well choose to
do so as a matter of legislative policy may conceivably find
that other claims for public funds within or without the
criminal justice system preclude the implementation of such
a policy at the present time.138
Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent, emphasized the idea of
differential justice based on wealth.139 Discretionary appeals call for
skill and legal knowledge beyond that of a pro se prisoner attempting
to reiterate a claim already raised at trial.140 The highest court shapes
the course of law for those lacking financial resources—who are
without a voice at both the state and federal level. Accordingly, legal
representation should rise to the level of a constitutional right,
especially for otherwise helpless indigent defendants.141
The Ross decision was concerned with overextending the
Fourteenth Amendment into venues without any mandates.142 The
138. Ross, 417 U.S. at 618; see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831 (1977) (“Among
the alternatives are the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under
lawyers’ supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as
volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys
through bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time
consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys, working either in new prison
legal assistance organizations or as part of public defender or legal services offices.”
(citation omitted)).
139. Ross, 417 U.S. at 619–20 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money
he has.’” (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963)).
140. Id. at 620–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d. 650,
653 (4th Cir. 1973) rev’d, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)) (“In many appeals, an articulate
defendant could file an effective brief by telling his story in simple language without
legalisms, but the technical requirements for applications for writs of certiorari are
hazards which one untrained in the law could hardly be expected to negotiate.”).
141. Id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moffitt, 483 F 2d. at 655)
(“Douglas v. California was grounded on concepts of fairness and equality. The right
to seek discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of
significant assistance to an indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that
the ‘same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of
right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals.’”).
142. See id. at 612 (majority opinion) (stating that “there are obviously limits
beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed without doing
violence to the principles recognized in other decisions by this Court”).
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appeals system—discretionary review in particular—is not
constitutionally required, and neither equal protection nor due
process demands representation beyond the first appeal.143 And yet,
reversals by the highest courts create the precedent that governs the
fairness and equal application of the laws in all cases.144 For the most
part, this law is made by retained counsel in a selective tranche of
cases.145 However, prisoners, the poor, and the disenfranchised—
who are the majority of the punished—have little input, if any at all.146
Moreover, appeals can be the nucleus of retrials, which thereafter
require the appointment of counsel. Markedly, this outcome
undermines the logic of protecting the innocent at the beginning and
begrudging the guilty after the fact. Yet, there is always a chance that
one’s innocence will be restored and their actual innocence finally
revealed.147 No plea or trial is perfect beyond all doubt or any
challenge.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (granting the court of appeals jurisdiction over
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts); see also Harlon L. Dalton, Taking
the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. J. 62, 62 n.4 (1985) (“It has long
been clear that the right to appeal is statutory, and is not constitutionally compelled.”
(citation omitted)).
144. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2018) (granting the Supreme Court certiorari
review “where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution”).
145. See Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber: A Small Group of Lawyers and its
Outsized Influence at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/
[https://perma.cc/5TGB-VE3T] (finding that 66 of the 17,000 lawyers who
petitioned the Supreme Court were involved in 43% of the cases the high court chose
to decide from 2004 through 2012).
146. See id. (statement of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (“Business can pay for the
best counsel money can buy. The average citizen cannot . . . . That’s just a reality.”).
147. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 57 (1991) (examining the importance of
the appeals process and how representation plays a role; specifically noting Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Douglas declaring that guidance of counsel is “necessary to the fair
administration of justice” within a discretionary appeal (quoting Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 366 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Ralph
Grunewald, Comparing Injustices: Truth, Justice, and the System, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1139,
1183–84 (2014) (discussing the rare conditions under which a defendant may appeal,
the difficulty to prove innocence at the appeals stage, and the reasons preservation of
evidence is sometimes not readily available).
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B. Pennsylvania v. Finley
Dorothy Finley was convicted of murder by the state of
Pennsylvania and sentenced to life in prison.148 After the court of
appeals affirmed Finley’s conviction, she filed a post-conviction
motion pro se.149 The trial court denied her motion, but the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed that decision and ordered
appointment of counsel.150 On remand, the lawyer appointed to
represent Finley concluded there were no issues worthy of review.151
The trial court agreed, granted counsel's request to withdraw, and
dismissed the motion.152
When Finley received another appointed lawyer to appeal that
decision, the Superior Court held that the first lawyer's withdrawal
had violated the procedures in Anders v. California.153 In the U.S.
Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist rejected the idea that Anders could
apply to a post-conviction proceeding because there was no right to
counsel.154 However, Anders drew its strength from the equal-
protection reasoning of Douglas; a case addressing the right to
counsel in a direct appeal.155
148. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553 (1987).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Finley, 440 A.2d 1183, 1184–85 (Pa. 1981).
151. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 553–54 (citing Commonwealth v. Finley, 479 A.2d 568, 570 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984) (noting that Pennsylvania adheres to the standards set out in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)); id. at 551 (listing the procedures in Anders for
appointed counsel for an indigent defendant to withdraw as (1) if “on direct appeal”
the attorney “finds the case to be wholly frivolous,” the attorney “must request the
court’s permission to withdraw” and must “submit a brief referring to anything in the
record arguably supporting the appeal”; (2) “a copy of the brief must be furnished the
[sic] indigent and time must be allowed for him to raise any points that he chooses”;
and (3) “the court itself must then decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”); see
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (holding that the failure to grant the services of an advocate
to an indigent petitioner seeking initial review of conviction—as contrasted with an
amicus curiae, which would have been available to an appellant with financial
means—violated petitioner’s rights to fair procedure and equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Commonwealth v. Finley, 440 A.2d 1183, 1184–85
(Pa. 1981) (ordering the trial court to determine whether Finley is entitled to the
appointment of counsel on remand).
154. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.
155. Id. at 554 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963)).
36
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 16
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss1/16
302 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
In Finley, the majority spoke in terms of fairness and equality:
“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to
counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, and
we decline to so hold today.”156 The Court went on to say: “Rather, it
is the source of that right to a lawyer's assistance, combined with the
nature of the proceedings, that controls the constitutional question. In
this case, respondent's access to a lawyer is the result of the State's
decision, not the command of the United States Constitution.”157
Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Finley fell directly in line with
Ross’s reasoning.158
Thus, after trial and direct appeal, proceedings are treated as
collateral and inconsequential civil matters,159 which means that
copies of the appellate record and brief suffice—just as in Ross—to
create "meaningful access" to the courts.160 Still, without a right to
post-conviction counsel, an appellant is denied all associated
rights.161 In Finley, the appellant had a lawyer, the trial court reviewed
her claims, and the state owed her nothing more.162 Succinctly put, the
Court reverted to the Bounds rationale, leaving the discretion to
implement access to procedures beyond the constitutional right to
counsel to the states.163
156. Id. at 555 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969)).
157. Id. at 556.
158. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (“We do not believe that the Due
Process Clause requires [a State] to provide respondent with counsel on his
discretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court.”).
159. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
160. Id.; Ross, 417 U.S. at 615.
161. However, Maples, Martinez, and Pinholster might suggest a changing tide. See
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (“Cause for a procedural default exists
where ‘something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be
attributed to him[,] . . . “impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural
rule.”’” (alterations in original) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
753(1991)); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (holding that “[i]nadequate
assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for
a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”); Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 195–96 (2011) (reaffirming that the Strickland standard
governs ineffectiveness of counsel challenges).
162. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 557–58.
163. Id. at 559 (“At bottom, the decision below rests on a premise that we are
unwilling to accept[—]that when a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief
from convictions, the Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance
must assume. On the contrary, in this area States have substantial discretion to
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Dissenting, Justice Brennan noted the basic values of an
adversarial system:
Even if the Anders requirements were not mandated by due
process, the performance of Finley's counsel clearly violated
minimal standards of fundamental fairness. At a minimum,
due process requires that counsel perform as an advocate.
The “very premise of our adversarial system . . . is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the
innocent go free.”’ It is fundamentally unfair for appointed
counsel to argue against his or her client's claims without
providing notice or an opportunity for that client either to
proceed pro se or to seek the advice of another attorney.164
The tension created in the Anders scenario is magnified a
thousand times when the pro se prisoner faces the entire
armamentarium of post-conviction law when making their claim. No
mere Anders-like procedure will protect their interests.165
C. Murray v. Giarratano
Murray v. Giarratano was the last nail in the coffin for an inmate’s
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.166 This decision
refused to extend the federal right of appointed counsel to various
state and federal habeas proceedings.167 Joseph M. Giarratano, along
with other Virginia prisoners facing capital punishment, asked for
appointment of counsel in his state habeas proceeding.168 When it
was denied, Giarratano filed a section 1983 action169 against the state
develop and implement programs to aid prisoners seeking to secure postconviction
review.”); see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
164. Finley, 481 U.S. at 568 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
165. Compare Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (requiring appointed
counsel on subsequent post-conviction appeals after the first appeal of right to act as
advocate, not as amicus curiae), with Finley, 481 U.S. 551(majority opinion) (holding
that an indigent prisoner had no due process right to appointed counsel in post-
conviction proceeding after exhaustion of appellate process).
166. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
167. See id.; Finley, 481 U.S. 551; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817.
168. Murray, 492 U.S. at 4.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (prohibiting the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” under “any color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia” of “any citizen of the United States or person within the
jurisdiction thereof”); see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997); Wyatt v.
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and its director of the Department of Corrections, Edward W.
Murray.170 The district court certified a class of defendants
comprising everyone on death row, present and future, who was
indigent and unable to afford counsel.171
Relying on Bounds and the special considerations of capital
punishment, the district court recognized that (1) the death row
inmates had limited time to prepare their petitions, (2) each case was
“unusually complex,” and (3) the inmates’ burden of living under the
pall of execution interfered with their ability to represent
themselves.172 Further, the district court found that the “plaintiffs
[were] incapable of effectively using lawbooks to raise their claims”
and concluded that providing inmates library access and permitting
them to keep books in their cells was not enough.173 Simply stated, the
court realized that no collection of books could replace the meaningful
guidance of counsel at such a critical stage.174
Under the district court’s ruling, retaining counsel was beyond
the means of death row prisoners; the appointment of a legal advisors
pursuant to Bounds was insufficient; and appointment of full
representation after the filing of a petition—which might trigger a
hearing—was deemed too late.175 Moreover, the district court
decided that pro bono or volunteer attorneys were too small in
Cole 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from
using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed
rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”).
170. Murray, 492 U.S. at 4.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986), reh’g,
847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 492 U.S. 1
(1989)).
173. Id. at 4–5 (citing Giarratano, 668 F. Supp at 513).
174. See id. at 5. See generally Jonathan Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: The
Failings and the Future of Prison Law Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1175 (2013)
(“What’s required is legal services, not law books.” (quoting William Bennett Turner,
NAACP Attorney, Relevant Court Decisions—A Legal View, Address Before the Prison
Legal Libraries: Idea into Reality Conference (Apr. 22, 1972))).
175. See Murray, 492 U.S. at 5–6 (noting that “the District Court concluded that
Virginia’s provisions for appointment of counsel after a petition is filed did not cure
the problem” and that this “was primarily because ‘the timing of the appointment is a
fatal defect’ as the inmate ‘would not receive the attorney’s assistance in the critical
stages of developing his claims’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Giarratano, 668 F. Supp.
at 515)).
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number to provide “a meaningful right of access to the courts.”176 So,
the district court ordered Virginia to create an assigned counsel
program for this very purpose.177 The district judge's farsighted
reasoning was initially rejected on appeal, then affirmed by an en banc
panel in a subsequent rehearing of the case.178 The fact-finding below
concerning the special considerations relevant to death row inmates
convinced the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of the need for
“personal attorneys.”179 In the Fourth Circuit’s view, capital litigation
took this case out of the purview of Finley.180 Unfortunately, this
reasoning did not hold up before the Supreme Court.181
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, extinguished the last
embers of due process and equal protection in the post-conviction
right-to-counsel arena.182 Citing Finley, he declared that meaningful
access did not impose an obligation on states to provide post-
conviction counsel.183 The Court reiterated that the Sixth
Amendment’s ambit begins with the trial as per Gideon184 and extends
to direct appeal under Douglas.185 The right to counsel, according to
the majority, protected the presumption of innocence, which could
only be shorn away by a fair trial.186 Nevertheless, because
discretionary appeals and habeas corpus arrive after the presumption
of guilt has settled in, no federal constitutional right to appointed
counsel existed post-appeal.187
Because discretionary post-conviction remedies are currently a
weak and unimpressive source of justice, the states seemingly have
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id. (stating the district court decision was limited to state habeas corpus
because no such right existed insofar as federal habeas was concerned (citing Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618–17 (1974))).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 7 (“‘Finley was not a meaningful access case, nor did it address the rule
enunciated in Bounds v. Smith. Most significantly,’ thought the Fourth Circuit, ‘Finley
did not involve the death penalty.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Giarratano v. Murray,
847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 492 U.S. 1 (1989))).
181. Id. at 10.
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 7 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344–45 (1963)).
185. Id. (first citing Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357–58 (1963); then citing
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19–20 (1956)).
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id. at 7–8 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 610 (1974)).
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no duty to provide counsel. Even the heightened scrutiny of death-
penalty prosecutions did not warrant this additional layer.188
Specifically, no duty to provide counsel exists because there is a belief
that capital cases are frontloaded with protections to avoid
miscarriages of justice. And yet, miscarriages of justice persist;189
thus, invalidating the notion that the Eighth Amendment provides
adequate safeguards.190
More damning was Murray’s treatment of Bounds. The majority
read Bounds to mandate access to courts through law books, not
lawyers:
The Court held in Bounds that a prisoner's "right of access"
to the courts required a State to furnish access to adequate
law libraries in order that the prisoners might prepare
petitions for judicial relief. But it would be a strange
jurisprudence that permitted the extension of that holding to
partially overrule a subsequently decided case such as
Finley which held that prisoners seeking judicial relief from
188. Id. at 8–9.
189. See Gross, Rate of False Conviction, supra note 58, at 7234 (“We present a
conservative estimate of the proportion of erroneous convictions of defendants
sentenced to death in the United States from 1973 through 2004, 4.1%.”); id. at 7235
(“This is only part of a disturbing picture. Fewer than half of all defendants who are
convicted of capital murder are ever sentenced to death in the first place. Sentencing
juries, like other participants in the process, worry about the execution of innocent
defendants. Interviews with jurors who participated in capital sentencing
proceedings indicate that lingering doubts about the defendant’s guilt is the strongest
available predictor of a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. It follows
that the rate of innocence must be higher for convicted capital defendants who are
not sentenced to death than for those who are. The net result is that the great majority
of innocent defendants who are convicted of capital murder in the United States are
neither executed nor exonerated. They are sentenced, or resentenced to prison for
life, and then forgotten.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
190. Murray, 492 U.S. at 10 (“We think that these cases require the conclusion
that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in capital cases than
in noncapital cases. State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required as
an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different and more limited
purpose than either the trial or appeal. The additional safeguards imposed by the
Eighth Amendment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we think, sufficient to assure
the reliability of the process by which the death penalty is imposed.” (footnote
omitted)).
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their sentence in state proceedings were not entitled to
counsel.191
In other words, Bounds stopped defendants’ right to counsel at
the library bookshelves.
However, the majority in Murray would not promote the notion
that Bounds overruled Finley. The Court was concerned that ad hoc
fact-finding in each state would create inconsistencies and burden the
states’ judicial systems.192 To bolster this point, the majority again
resorted to the “categorical” findings stated in the Gideon line of cases
concerning the trial and direct appeal rights to counsel for the
indigent.193 And without any seeming contradiction, the Court
approved the abandonment of the case-by-case analysis of Betts,194
while leaving the current haphazard system of discretionary pro bono
counsel intact.195 Thus, Finley's scope was expanded to include the
death penalty, unhampered by the Bounds holding.196 To that end, the
case was remanded to assess the level of library access.197
191. Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977)).
192. Id. at 11–12. Consider that this logic led from the totality-of-circumstances
approach of Betts to the categorical right under Gideon. Interestingly, one scholar has
observed that the categorical approach of Gideon has been undermined by the case-
by-case logic of ineffective assistance of counsel cases, beginning with Strickland. See
David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 117 (2006) (“In the end, the ineffectiveness standard
does less to protect defendants from bad lawyers than it does to legitimate the poor
quality of representation generally provided to criminal defendants.”).
193. Murray, 492 U.S. at 12 (listing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
194. Id. (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 471–72 (1942)).
195. Murray, 492 U.S. at 27, n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The availability of
appointed counsel on federal habeas thus presents the specter of a petitioner filing
for federal habeas corpus and attaining counsel, only to have the petition dismissed
as unexhausted and remanded to state court. Such a haphazard procedure scarcely
would serve any interest in finality. It would further raise questions regarding the
obligations not only of the appointed counsel to effect exhaustion at the state level,
but also of the Federal Treasury to pay for those efforts.” (citation omitted)).
196. Id. at 13–14 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 13–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Unlike Gideon, post-conviction counsel for the poor was a purely legislative choice.
See id. at 13–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 13 (majority opinion) (“Petitioners and respondents disagree as to the
practices currently in effect in Virginia state prisons with respect to death row
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Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, singled out Bounds’s
imperative premise of having “meaningful access” to the courts as a
facet to the right to counsel.198 The wellspring was Powell'’s emphasis
on the cognitive and educational challenges of the accused and
confined—oppressive conditions that burdened decision-making and
the time limits for defense preparation—that militated the need for
representation.199 The dissent drew on a line of cases demanding
financial equality in pursuing the appellate process, given that faulty
convictions are reserved on appeal and such claims may otherwise
remain undetected.200
Justice Stevens went on to recount the course of the right to
counsel and the frontier of the post-conviction right imposed by due
process.201 Yet, the definition of fairness that separated a “meaningful
appeal” from a “meaningless ritual” had yet to be determined.202 From
the Court’s perspective, the previous decisions constituted access to
the courts. However, the right to counsel begged further inquisition.
prisoners. Respondents contend that these prisoners are denied adequate and timely
access to a law library during the final weeks before the date set for their execution.
If respondents are correct, the District Court on remand may remedy this situation
without any need to enlarge the holding of Bounds.”). Stranger still is the belief that
information access and the right to representation are somehow distinct. See Ken
Strutin, Justice Without ‘Bounds’ and the Poverties of Confinement, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 23,
2014), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202669775191/
[https://perma.cc/DV5X-99H3] (“Every step in information evolution has brought
literacy and enlightenment, from the discovery of language and writing to the
invention of printing and computing. Each stride forward has left behind the poor, the
punished[,] and the confined. The ideas behind the right to counsel and the right to
libraries have historically and mistakenly been treated as separate. Today, the
revelations of science and technology impel the recognition of both as one.”).
198. Murray, 492 U.S. at 15–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 16–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932)); see Powell, 287 U.S. at 57–58 (“The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate,
surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of soldiers,
charged with an atrocious crime regarded with especial horror in the community
where they were to be tried, were thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments
after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to
represent them.”).
200. Murray, 492 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing decisions concerning
filing fees and transcript costs: Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956)).
201. Murray, 492 U.S. at 17–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The issue was not merely “whether there [was] an absolute ‘right to
counsel’ in collateral proceedings, but whether due process require[d]
that these respondents be appointed counsel in order to pursue legal
remedies.”203
The dissent's answer relied on the special considerations of
death row inmates that Finley did not address.204 In other words, the
uniqueness of capital punishment and its need for heightened
scrutiny—coupled with the statistical fact that appellate review is not
enough to protect life in capital cases205—warranted post-conviction
counsel across the board.206 Because some claims can only be made
post-appeal, the appellate record and brief, on their own, are not equal
to the task of pursuing total justice.207 Indeed, federal habeas review
is curtailed by the record in state court, making post-conviction fact-
finding vital.208
Lastly, Justice Stevens argued that the conditions on death row,
like solitary confinement or other institutional settings without access
to adequate libraries, burden prisoners’ ability to prepare and file
petitions of any kind.209 Added to this factor is the complexity of
203. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 28–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “a judgment that it is not
unfair to require an ordinary inmate to rely on his own resources to prepare a petition
for postconviction relief does not justify the same conclusion for the death row
inmate who must acquire an understanding of this specialized area of law and
prepare an application for state of execution as well as a petition for collateral relief”
and that “there is a profound difference between capital postconviction litigation and
ordinary postconviction litigation in Virginia” and that “to obtain an adequate
opportunity to present their postconviction claims fairly, death row inmates need
greater assistance of counsel than Virginia affords them” (citations omitted)).
205. Id. at 20–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 23–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is, however, significant evidence
that in capital cases what is ordinarily considered direct review does not sufficiently
safeguard against miscarriages of justice to warrant this presumption of finality.
Federal habeas courts granted relief in only 0.25% to 7% of noncapital cases in recent
years; in striking contrast, the success rate in capital cases ranged from 60% to 70%.
Such a high incidence of uncorrected error demonstrates that the meaningful
appellate review necessary in a capital case extends beyond the direct appellate
process.” (footnotes omitted)).
207. Id. at 25–26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 26–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 27–28 (“Unlike the ordinary inmate, who presumably has ample time
to use and reuse the prison library and to seek guidance from other prisoners
experienced in preparing pro se petitions, a grim deadline imposes a finite limit on
the condemned person’s capacity for useful research.” (citation omitted)).
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death-penalty post-conviction litigation and the drained mental state
of those facing death.210 In its conclusion, the Murray opinion
pronounced: “Meaningful access, and meaningful judicial review,
would be effected in this case only if counsel were appointed, on
request, in time to enable examination of the case record, factual
investigation, and preparation of a petition containing all meritorious
claims, which the same attorney then could litigate to its
conclusion.”211
D. Realities of the Law Without Counsel
Bounds’s philosophical notion that the doctrinal scales should
never tip in favor of the right to counsel ignores the changing
landscape and the harsh realities of poverties that Gideon
explained.212 Under our current system, true justice is sacrificed for
efficiency and commoditized into jail and prison time. In such a
system, effective representation is compromised from the beginning.
The presumption of innocence earned its place in U.S.
jurisprudence from the Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Winship213
and Gideon.214 Since then, the presumption of innocence has lost its
sanctity through the rise of plea bargaining, as evidenced by the
prevalence of exonerations. As a result, the revered doctrine of
presumed innocence has devolved into a presumption of guilt.215
210. Id. at 27–28. See generally Strutin, Litigating, supra note 49, at 344, 354
(explaining the inhumane challenges faced by those who are imprisoned without
counsel).
211. Murray, 492 U.S. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (explaining that a person
who cannot afford to hire an attorney has no guarantee to a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for the person).
213. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard
provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.’” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895))).
214. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
215. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 357
(1995) (stating that when “an accused’s innocence, whether factual or legal, is
overcome by standards of proof associated with . . . plea bargaining” the “result of the
criminal process is a presumption of guilt and a status degradation”).
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Criminal justice was not invented to protect finality, but largely to
preserve innocence.216 Every day, the innocent plead guilty and bow
to the tyranny of probable cause, charging decisions,217 predicate or
enhanced offenses,218 excessive bail, conditions of confinement,219
poverty, racial prejudice,220 government leveraging, sentencing
length, mandatory minimums,221 excessive caseloads,222 narrowing
216. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice
and the Presumption of Innocence, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 505, 523 (2014) (“At the end of
the day, what matters is not the label of a system as criminal nor the invocation of the
presumption of innocence. Rather, what matters is that the state accord its citizens
with the proper respect.”); Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal
Defendant and the Presumption of Innocence: In The Hands of Real Jurors, is Either Of
Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 250 (2006) (“One might expect that . . . jurors
would at least understand the pattern instructions on the presumption of innocence.
If so, one would be greatly mistaken.” (citation omitted)); Richard D. Friedman, A
Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873, 883 (2000).
217. See Guide for Users: II. Preliminary Proceedings, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 269, 269 (2017) (“The government has broad discretion to initiate and conduct
criminal prosecutions because of the separation of powers doctrine and because
prosecutorial decisions are ‘particularly ill-suited for judicial review.’” (quoting
Wayte v. U.S., 598, 607 (1985))); Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice
and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 315 (2017) (discussing suggested
changes for recalibrating the charging function for prosecutors); Prosecutorial
Discretion, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 269 (2017).
218. See, e.g., Caitlyn L. Hall, Good Intentions: A National Survey of Life Sentences
for Violent Offenses, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1101, 1126–38 (2013) (discussing
triggering and predicate offenses that are both violent and nonviolent offenses
resulting in life in prison).
219. See Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, “What’s Going On in Our Prisons?”,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/opinion/whats-
going-on-in-our-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/3LUE-BSE6].
220. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1615 (1985).
221. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (holding that any
facts may be used by courts to increase a sentence beyond statutory maximums,
except for prior convictions, when the jury finds such facts are present beyond a
reasonable doubt); Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner’s Perspective, 2004 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 935, 935 (2004); see also Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentencing
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097, 1150. 1153 (2001).
222. See Alexa Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are Too
Overworked to Defend Them, GUARDIAN (Jun. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.co
m/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked
[https://perma.cc/ADB7-QYXC] (“Excessive caseloads contribute to this trend, and
result in a ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em’ system of justice, in which clients have little more
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windows of post-appeal review, and the war on crime. A plea that is
secured under these pressures does not sanitize or constitutionalize
convicting the innocent. Most problematically, under these pressures,
constitutional violations exclude a prisoner’s waiver of rights223 and
convictions. These injustices cannot be erased by a system of
contractual guilt where, due to the realities they face, the poor are
pressured into accepting plea agreements.
Therefore, part of the cure for mass incarceration is the right to
counsel—the fountainhead of new learning, discovery, and
thinking.224 There is no substitute for the vision and voice of
experience, or the zealousness of human advocacy.225 Post-conviction
relief requires more than legal mechanics. It is the confidence,
compassion, trust, and zealousness of counsel for the oppressed,
outcast, and disenfranchised that levels the playing field in every
courthouse.226
than a brief conversation in the courtroom with a harried public defender before
pleading guilty.”); see, e.g., Oliver Laughland, The Human Toll of America’s Public
Defender Crisis, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-us-criminal-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/7UAW-37M7] (“In Cole County, Missouri, defenders work more
than 225% above the recommended caseload limits.”).
223. Waivers now include the right to trial, appeal, and claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Waiver of Issues at Trial, U.S. COURT-MARSHAL LAWYER PHILIP
D. CAVE, https://www.court-martial.com/waiver-of-issues-at-trial.html
[http://perma.cc/YTW2-Q2PP].
224. See Strutin, Report, supra note 84 (“Decrying the lamentable state of forensic
proof, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, a senior adviser to PCAST, admonished:
‘Among the more than 2.2 million inmates in U.S. prisons and jails, countless may have
been convicted using unreliable or fabricated forensic science. The U.S. has an abiding
and unfulfilled moral obligation to free citizens who were imprisoned by such
questionable means.’”).
225. See Strutin, Million Dollar Brain, supra note 98 (“Legal education,
information technology[,] and law practice add up to an expensive thinking machine.
So, the right to counsel means access to a million-dollar brain—the product of natural
and artificial intelligences. Now that lawyers have been upgraded by technology, the
right to counsel needs upgrading as well.”).
226. In defense of the poor and any who are at risk of stigmatization and loss of
liberty, process must become passion. See Steven Zeidman, Raising the Bar: Indigent
Defense and the Right to a Partisan Lawyer, 69 MERCER L. REV. 697, 708 (2018) (“It is
therefore critical to ensure that only partisan lawyers—those who bleed for their
clients, who stay up nights agonizing over each case they handle and what they could
have done better, who trek out to jails and prisons in the heat of the summer and the
cold of the winter, who are fully and unequivocally committed and faithful to their
clients—are permitted to represent indigent defendants.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Gideon extended the mind of the accused onto their attorney.227
When the Supreme Court put poverty at the forefront of the Sixth
Amendment, it exalted human dignity. It also opened a door to all the
poverties that separate people from justice through incarceration.
Specifically, mass incarceration that is inherently fueled by
discrimination not only creates, but also perpetuates, a crisis of
wrongful conviction, excessive punishment, and inhumane treatment
of human beings.228 Recognizing that poverties exact an
unconstitutional toll on the imprisoned can rescue millions from the
legal death of confinement.229
The composition of the imprisoned population tells a tale of
penury, racism,230 gender discrimination,231 mistreatment due to
227. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
228. See generally Joshua Dubler & Vincent Lloyd, Think Prison Abolition in
America is Impossible? It Once Felt Inevitable, GUARDIAN (May 19, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/19/prison-abolition-
america-impossible-inevitable [https://perma.cc/623G-6ZBR] (“In accounting for
the rise of what many now call ‘mass incarceration[,]’ scholars point to race, politics[,]
and economics as driving factors.”).
229. See generally Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, State of
the Union Address: The Four Freedoms (Jan. 6, 1941) (“This nation has placed its
destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women; and
its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of
human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights
or keep them. Our strength is our unity of purpose. To that high concept there can be
no end save victory.”).
230. See D.J. Silton, U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides
a Vicious Cycle, 20 L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRAC. 53, 53 (2002) (noting that “the term
‘institutionalized racism’ is not too harsh a term” for the “statistic” that “[t]here are
more [B]lack people in prisons and jails than in colleges and universities” (alteration
in original) (quoting C. Victor Lander, Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 2 ANN.
2000 ATLA-CLE 1801 (2000))).
231. See Melamed, supra note 32 (“Gender is just one of a multiplicity of
inequalities that combine to form the patterns of poverty and exclusion that we see
in the world today.”); see, e.g., Hannah Brenner et. al., Bars to Justice: The Impact of
Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 527 (2016) (“We then
consider how, by virtue of incarcerated status, it is impossible for women victimized
in prison to meet the ideal victim standards, ultimately rendering their attempts at
seeking justice futile.”).
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gender identity and preference,232 mental disability,233 and the raw
victimization that accompanies all confinement. Hence, a post-
conviction right to counsel ought to draw from the well of
incarceration, with a presumption of poverties.
Prison cuts a swath through humanity.234 And like every evil
invention—racism, slavery, and genocide—prison falls heaviest on
the poor, people of color, noncitizens, minorities, and politically and
socially contrived outcasts—the essential “others” that society
segregates and demonizes. By confiscating freedom and stealing
destinies, incarceration instills fear and empowers short-sighted,
bargained-for justice. And yet, every petition from a prisoner is a
declaration of an intent to live, filed in defiance of every indignity that
has been inflicted for the sake of retribution.235
Everyone in prison, jail, immigration detention,236 and civil
confinement are under the absolute control and mercy of the state.
232. See generally Strutin, Prison Affected People, supra note 38 (discussing that
“[t]he incarcerative experience embraces many scenarios that affect well-being, daily
living, and dignity[,]” including “gender identity and sexual orientation (LGBT)”
among the list of scenarios).
233. See Hadley, supra note 36 (providing statistics and estimates showing the
prevalence of mental health problems rampant amongst prisoners and jail inmates).
234. Capture, confinement, suffering, and death are facets of various systems of
dehumanization, destruction, and terror. See generally Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.
Supp. 544, 548–49 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev’d, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973) (“With
respect to the intrinsic importance of the challenges, I [Judge James E. Doyle] am
persuaded that the institution of prison probably must end. In many respects it is as
intolerable within the United States as was the institution of slavery, equally
brutalizing to all involved, equally toxic to the social system, equally subversive of the
brotherhood of man, even more costly by some standards, and probably less
rational.”).
235. The atavism of civil death would of necessity drag down the right to counsel
with it. See, e.g., Gallop v. Adult Corr. Instituts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1141 (R.I. 2018) (“We
are of the opinion that [General Laws 1956] § 13–6–1 is clear and unambiguous on
its face and should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning, as
intended by the Legislature. The statute unambiguously declares that a person such
as plaintiff, who is serving a life sentence, is deemed civilly dead and thus does not
possess most commonly recognized civil rights. The Legislature has enumerated
certain exceptions to § 13–6–1—’[h]owever, the bond of matrimony shall not be
dissolved’—but there is no exception for claims impacting a prisoner’s civil rights.”
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
236. See Lorelei Laird, Separating Families Violates Civil Rights, Won’t Work and Is
Inhumane, ABA President Says, A.B.A. J. (June 12, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/separating_families_violates_civil_rights_wont_work_and_is_inhuman
e_aba_pre [https://perma.cc/7RJY-VY28] (“A letter written by ABA President Hilarie
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Lawyers must serve as independent, fearless, and conflict-free
advocates. These qualities—which are, by extension, inherently and
necessarily encompassed in the right to counsel—are invaluable to
the prisoner who is perpetually encumbered by confinement.
Time feels heavier in prison, where people of all kinds are
ceaselessly confined to four concrete walls. For the punished, life is
but the distribution of pain—a million screams muffled by miles of
concrete. It is a kind of suffering that is neatly organized, yet
incomprehensible to law makers and judges. Prison imposes the pain
of retribution multiplied by unfixed time and uncertainty of
release.237 It deadens humanity through the exaltation of suffering.
Prisoners are ruled by the tyrannies of timelessness, pain of
confinement, and uncertainty of punishment's end—each guided by
the invisible hand of racism and systematic oppression. As a result,
pain, poverty, and discrimination lay the foundation for the need for
post-conviction representation.
Gideon brought the Sixth Amendment to the poor.238 This
decision was thereafter reimagined to serve indigent appellants in a
Bass reiterates the association’s strong opposition to the Justice Department’s month-
old practice of separating families at the border. The letter, released Tuesday, says
public comments from Trump administration officials have made it clear that ‘a
primary purpose of the “zero tolerance” policy is to serve as a deterrent.’”).
237. Uncertainty is the great villain of incarceration: not knowing when, if ever,
the prison gate will open. Protecting the right to counsel post-conviction is one means
of freeing the incarcerated from uncertainty and provides them with hope that justice
might be served after all. See generally Carrie Johnson, Prisoners Face Uncertainties As
Number of Halfway Houses Are Cut, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 20, 2017, 9:11 PM),
https://www.nhpr.org/post/prisoners-face-uncertainty-number-halfway-houses-
are-cut#stream/0 [http://perma.cc/Y8PQ-7HCL] (explaining that the “Federal
Bureau of Prisons has quietly ended contracts with several halfway houses across
that country” and that “[s]ome inmates say that change is keeping prisoners locked
up longer and hurting their chances of finding work on the outside”); Allison Schrager,
In America, Mass Incarceration Has Caused More Crime Than It’s Prevented, QUARTZ
(July 22, 2015), https://qz.com/458675/in-america-mass-incarceration-has-caused-
more-crime-than-its-prevented/ [http://perma.cc/NU26-WAAS] (noting that “jail
time often depends on the judge that is assigned, the prosecutor, available evidence,
and how busy the court is”); Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row [http://perma.cc/CM8Z-QV8A]
(noting that “prisoners on death row-inmates live in a state of constant uncertainty
over when they will be executed”).
238. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
50
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 16
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss1/16
316 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
sub-constitutional direct-review context.239 Moreover, Gideon
signified a philosophical departure from the judicial system’s limited
focus on retribution and instead focused on constitutional values and
human dignity. But then, Gideon’s Sixth Amendment progress came to
a halt.240 As Gideon’s influence continues to wane, prison usurps
today’s justice system of its inherent humanity. Instead of refining
Sixth Amendment protections contemplated in Gideon, prison
libraries are filled with outdated, densely written, and overly complex
law books that ultimately provide unrealistic notions about
lawyering. Accordingly, the right to be heard, to be represented by
counsel, and to redress grievances must counterbalance the
governmental powers that interrupt liberty, suspend dignity, and
denigrate autonomy. Without proper balance, justice simply cannot
be served. Thus, a return to Gideon would be a step in the right
direction for criminal justice and could tip the scales of justice
towards equality.
More than one million lawyers fill today’s workforce, and yet
justice is served in such meager portions.241 Despite a significant
influx of lawyers, millions of individuals and their futures are cast
away without any hope. What kind of society enhances laws and
multiplies lawyers while diminishing notions of liberty and justice?
Mass incarceration began and continued under Gideon’s watch. The
enshrinement of the right to counsel dominated; meanwhile,
criminalization increased swiftly through the rise of racial profiling,
239. See id.; Mark V. Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement,
Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1871–72 (2001),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1255&context
=facpub [https://perma.cc/7NSW-P4CA] (discussing “subconstitutional doctrines as
supplements to the forms of judicial review that dominate theorizing about
constitutional law”).
240. See C.J. Ciaramella, The Disappearing Sixth Amendment, REASON (June 2017),
https://reason.com/2017/05/07/the-disappearing-sixth-amendme/
[http://perma.cc/FMD2-D4EZ].
241. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Population 15% Higher Than 10 Years Ago,
New ABA Data Shows, A.B.A. J. (May 3, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/art
icle/lawyer_population_15_higher_than_10_years_ago_new_aba_data_shows
[https://perma.cc/DK3G-6KAP] (stating that”[t]he total number of lawyers in the
United States as of Dec. 31 was 1,338,678”). See generally Legal Profession Statistics,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/resources_for_lawyers/profession_statistics.html
[https://perma.cc/9Q4N-YWN7] (providing “[c]urrent statistical data . . . to assist
with research on lawyers and the legal profession”).
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mandatory minimums, and wrongful convictions. As a direct result,
prison populations exploded. It will likewise take another storm of
social energy to recognize that decreasing incarceration begins with
the right to counsel. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights concluded his recent report by declaring:
“In the United States, it is poverty that needs to be arrested, not the
poor simply for being poor.”242
The feudal world that produced the Magna Carta heralded the
social contract of modern democracy.243 Further, that world
“provided the chief justification for later efforts to limit royal
authority and has come to be recognized as an important source for
the modern conviction that human rights and dignity are safe only
within the framework of a constitution."244 A living constitution does
not succumb to the architects of fear.245 It rises above the evils of
racism, hatred and poverty.
The isolated prisoner is helpless before the law without the
guidance of counsel. The prisoner faces the weight of the state and the
public’s condemnation, and has neither the ability nor the resources
to wage a battle for freedom from inside a cell. But his attorney does.
The capable attorney is equipped with legal education and training,
and possesses knowledge and skills designed to aid the client in his
endeavors. Thus, the attorney can accomplish feats that the client
cannot. For this simple reason alone—from indictment to conviction,
from jail to prison—the impoverished prisoner not only deserves to
242. Alston, supra note 1, ¶ 73.
243. See RAY STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 123–24 (1966);
James Podgers, America’s Magna Carta, A.B.A. J., June 2015, at 36, 38; James Podgers,
Learning Opportunity: ABA Initiatives Seek to Raise Public Awareness About the Magna
Carta’s Significance, 100 A.B.A. J., Dec. 2014, at 66–67; David Hudson, This Day in
History: The Magna Carta, a Foundation of Our Democracy, WHITE HOUSE (June 15,
2015, 3:36 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/06/15/day-
history-magna-carta-foundation-our-democracy [https://perma.cc/2GYD-8NWD].
244. SIDNEY PAINTER, MEDIAEVAL SOCIETY 100 (1951).
245. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 290–91 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (highlighting that the “Constitution is a living reality, not
parchment preserved under glass” in asserting that the majority’s holding violated
First Amendment rights (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist. Bexar Cty., 462 F.2d
960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972))); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1743 (2007) (discussing our living Constitution and its relation to
our “rising national consciousness”); see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584,
2593, 2605–06 (2015) (holding that the Constitution protects the right to same-sex
marriage).
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be represented, representation should be a basic, fundamental,
constitutional right. Thus, Gideon must be unchained so that the
innocent may go free.
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